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Martha Minow*
"We were different/We knew we were different/We  were told we were
different," 1  stated Chief Flying Eagle  of the Mashpee  Wampanoag Indi-
ans  in  the course  of a  trial  over  their tribal  status.  The  plaintiffs,  the
Mashpee Indians, asked for a determination that the residents  of "Cape
Cod's  Indian  Town"  were  direct  descendants  of  Native  Americans
known as the Mashpee,  had lived continuously as a tribe, and thus were
entitled to regain control of the land in their town despite repeated sales
to non-Indians.  The defendant, the State of Massachusetts,  argued that
these people simply were a group with some Indian and some non-Indian
ancestors; they had essentially assimilated into mainstream American life
through  intermarriage  and acculturation  and thus had  no special claim
to the  land.2
The tribe's Medicine  Man at the time of the trial was named William
James.  This small detail exemplified the difficulty of the case.  Given the
same  name  as  one  of the  most  distinguished  American  philosophers,
how could this Medicine Man demonstrate the distinctive identity of his
tribe?  What would the other William James, the philosopher, say to this
question?
As  a  founding  parent  of pragmatism,  that  James  would  reject  any
approach to the riddle of identity that sought the essence of a person or a
group.  Rather than search for essences or intrinsic qualities of people or
concepts,  the pragmatists  looked  to purposes  and effects,  consequences
and functions.3  Similarly, the pragmatists preferred not to assess founda-
tions of knowledge.  Instead, they urged the questions: what works, and
*  I would like to thank the students  and faculty  at the University  of Toronto  Faculty  of Law
who  explored  many  of the  themes  presented  here  in  my  course,  "Knowing,  Reasoning,  and
Judging,"  and Elizabeth V. Spelman who taught an earlier version of this course with me at Harvard
Law  School.  Joe  Singer, Kate  Bartlett, Duncan  Kennedy,  Avi Soifer,  and Carol  Weisbrod each
gave me insightful  comments  on  an earlier draft.
1. James  Clifford,  The  Predicaments  of Culture  281  (1988)  (quoting Earl  Mills,  Chief Flying
Eagle).
2.  See  Paul  Brodeur,  Restitution:  The  Land  Claims  of the  Mashpee,  Passamaquoddy,  and
Penobscot  Indians of New  England  (1985);  James  Clifford, The Predicament  of Culture 8-9,  277-
346  (1988);  Francis Hutchins'  Mashpee:  The Story of Cape  Cod's Indian  Town (1979).
3.  See  Israel  Scheffier,  Four Pragmatists:  A  Critical  Introduction to Peirce,  James,  Mead, and
Dewey  110-121,  204-220  (1986).
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No  pragmatist  spirit  guided the  federal  district court  reviewing  the
claims  of the  Mashpee  Indians.5  The judge  thought  that the  identity
question  was  answerable  by  expert  historians  and  anthropologists.  He
ruled against the Mashpees  when a jury found the Mashpee  were a tribe
at  some  points  in  history  but  not  continuously  until the  present.6  Of
course, in a crude sense, the decision was pragmatic.  It "worked"  for the
white  owners  of the disputed lands  and  for the dominant  legal  system
generally, which has repeatedly undermined  Indian rights.7  But missing
from  the trial-and  from  many  legal  treatments  of questions  of iden-
tity-was an acknowledgment  that the cultural,  gender,  racial, and eth-
nic  identities  of a  person  are  not  simply  intrinsic  to  that  person,  but
depend  upon that person's  self-understanding  in conjunction  with  com-
munal  understandings.'
The  clash  between  a person's  internal and external  senses of self can
lead to the abandonment of the internal sense.9  People may find meaning
and  opportunity  for self-expression  in the tensions between  and among
who they themselves think they are and what others think of them.  This
tension  is especially  complex because people so often establish who they
are  by constructing  a  sense  of the  place and  identity  of others around
them.  Each  individual  has  different  degrees  of control  over  these  ten-
sions,  and different kinds of power  over their self-definition.
Relationships between people shape identities which depend on negoti-
ations and interactions between oneself and others.' 0  The relative power
4.  See  Hilary  Putnam,  A  Reconsideration of Dewey on  Democracy, 63  So.  Cal.  L.  Rev.  1671
(1990);  Marion Smiley,  Pragmatism as Political Theory,  63  So. Cal. L.  Rev.  See generally Cornel
West, The American  Evasion of Philosophy  (1981).
5.  See  Martha Minow, Making  All  the Difference  350-372,  (1990).
6.  See  Clifford, supra, at 335  (the jury found that the group did not constitute a tribe as of July
22,  1790, June 23,  1869, May 38,  1870, and August 26,  1976, although the jury  did find them a tribe
as of March  31,  1834 and  March 3,  1842).
7.  See  Joseph  William  Singer,  Property and Coercion in  Federal Indian Law:  The  Conflict
Between Critical  and Complacent Pragmatism,  63  So. Cal.  L. Rev.  1821  (1990).
8.  Angela Harris suggests "that we are not born with a 'self,'  but rather are composed of a welter
of partial, sometimes contradictory, or even antithetical  'selves.'  A  unified  identity, if such can ever
exist,  is  a  product  of  will,  not  a  common  destiny  or  natural  birthright."  Harris,  Race  and
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42  Stan. L.  Rev.  584  (1990).
9.  Some psychoanalytic  literature acknowledges this pattern,  see Alice Miller, The Drama of the
Gifted  Child  (1981),  but  most  psychological  work  on  identity  lacks  attention  to  the  multiple
relationships and  social contexts  within which people  forge their senses  of self.  For discussions of
both  this  limitation  and  efforts  to  include  social  dimensions  to  psychological  explorations  of
identity,  see  Changing  the  Subject:  Psychology,  Social  Regulation  and  Subjectivity  (Julian
Henriques,  Wendy  Hollway,  Cathy  Urwin,  Couze Veen & Valerie  Walkerdine  1984);  Children  of
Social Worlds (Martin  Richards  and Paul Light eds.  1986);  Culture Theory:  Essays on  Mind, Self,
and Emotion  (Richard Shweder  and  Robert Levine  eds.  1984).
10.  This  approach  bears  some  affinities  to  the  view  advocated  by  some  under  the  term
"positionality."  Both  the  emphasis  on  the  negotiated,  interactive  quality  of relationships  and  a
focus  on the social  and cultural  position of a person  as the source and impetus  for  identity depart
from the view that identities are innate, intrinsic to the person and stand free  from relationships and
position.  See, e.g.,  Linda Alcoff, Cultural  Feminism versus Post-Structuralism:  The Identity Crisis  in
Feminist Theory, 13  Signs 405, 433  (1988):  "The  essentialist definition of woman  makes her identity
[Vol.  3: 97
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enjoyed  by  some  people  compared  with  others  is  partly  manifested
through the ability to name oneself and others, and to influence the pro-
cess of negotiation over questions of identity.  Someone with the power to
select and express  his or her own desires  is someone with relative ability
to define identity.  Sometimes people  who seem to have little power over
exercising  either  their  desires  or  their  identities  can  nonetheless  exert
control by playing off other people's misconceptions and misunderstand-
ings.  People with  apparently  greater  power  in these  areas  nonetheless
encounter sharp limits because  of the presence  and  influence of others,
even those who have  less status and authority.
All  of this  seems  awkward  to  state  and unduly  abstract.  Works  of
fiction and  selected  legal  disputes  provide  sources  for  rich,  contextual
depictions of issues of identity.  Works of fiction afford  glimpses into the
interior lives  of characters.  They  can illuminate  the  potential  conflicts
between the identities experienced internally and those others project.  In
an era when  identities  seem  unmoored from  social  institutions  and  dis-
turbed  by  encounters  between  people  with  different  backgrounds, 1
authors of fiction rightly focus on the theme of identity as  a setting  for
dramatic tension and psychological  insight.
In what follows I will consider how works of fiction explore the negoti-
ated  quality  of identities  and  how  lawyers  and judges  neglect  it  when
they craft legal  arguments  and decisions.  Contemporary  scholarship  in
law and in literary criticism provides some vocabularies for talking about
negotiated identities, and fights over identity figure prominently in claims
of knowledge and judgment. 2  Looking at works of fiction and law with
independent  of her external  situation:  since her  nurturing  and  peaceful  traits are  innate  they  are
ontologically  autonomous  of her  position  with respect  to others or to the  external  historical  and
social conditions generally.  The positional definition, on the other hand, makes her identity  relative
to a constantly shifting context, to a situation that includes a network of elements involving others,
the objective economic conditions, cultural and political  institutions and ideologies,  and so on."  See
also  Diana  Fuss,  Reading Like a Feminist, 78  Differences  I  (Spring  1989);  Katharine  Bartlett,
Feminist Legal Methods,  103  Harv. L. Rev.  829,  880-887  (1990).
11.  See  Robert  Bellah,  et al,  Habits  of the Heart (1985);  Charles  Taylor,  Sources  of the  Self
(1989).
12.  For literary  theory  and  philosophy, see  Gloria Anzaldua,  Borderlands,  La Frontera:  The
New  Mestiza  (1987);  Diana  Fuss,  Essentially  Speaking:  Feminism,  Nature  & Difference  (1989)
(exploring  dangers  of essentialist thought); Henry  Louis Gates, Jr.,  Figures in Black:  Words,  Signs,
and the "Racial"  Self (1987);  Elizabeth Meese,  (Ex)tensions:  ReFiguring Feminist Criticism (1990);
Elizabeth  V.  Spelman,  Inessential  Woman:  Problems  of Exclusion  in  Feminist  Thought  (1988)
(examining  persistence  of  privilege  in  works  by  both  nonfeminists  and  feminists);  Kimberly
Benston, I  Yam  What I  am: The Topos of Un(naming) in Afro-American Literature,  in  Henry Louis
Gates,  Jr.,  ed.,  Black  Literature  and  Literary  Theory  151  (1984);  R.  Radhakrishan,  Negotiating
Subject Positions  in an Uneven  World, in Feminist and Institutions:  Dialogues on  Feminist Theory
(Linda  Kauffman  ed.  1989).
For recent legal analyses of identity and knowledge, see Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing  the
Intersection of Race and Sex:  A  Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist
Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 University  of Chicago  Legal Forum  139;  Angela  Harris, Race
and Essentialism  in Feminist  Legal Theory, 42  Stan. L. Rev. 581 (1990)  (arguing against essentialism
in definitions of identity); Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution:  Finding Our Place,
Asserting Our Rights, 24 Harv.  C.R.-C.L.  L.  Rev. 9  (1989).
Considerable  debate  over  the  significance  of  identity  to  knowledge  was  triggered  by  Randall
1991]
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the  notion  of negotiated  identity  within  patterns  of power  can  help
heighten  attention  to  the  pragmatist's  questions:  what  works,  and  for
whom.
Perhaps any effort in the new tradition of "law and humanities"  must
invent  meaning for the  conjunction of the  two.  I  mean to suggest that
lawyers  and  judges  have  something  to  learn  about  identity  from  the
nuanced evocation  of a process of negotiation depicted  in stories like the
ones discussed here.  But I also mean to avoid implying that lawyers and
judges  can or should use literature as they would  use legal  authority, or
that there is any easy  relationship between law and literature.  The pur-
poses  and  contexts of literary  texts  and  legal  argument  diverge.  It  is,
however,  the conviction that valuable  insights can be provoked  by con-
joining  and contrasting fiction  and law that motivates this piece.
I.  STORIES  OF  IDENTITY
Sometimes fiction  writers treat identities  as fixed,  assigned,  or innate.
But often the fictional exploration of people's interior consciousness  also
allows  explorations  of the  processes  through  which  people  make  and
remake  their identities and the identities of others,  as in the  stories dis-
cussed  here.
A.  Negotiating Identity
In  a  collection  called  The  Middleman and Other Stories,  Bharati
Mukherjee  includes one piece called  "A Wife's  Story."' 3  It begins with
the  narrator  criticizing,  to  herself, an  ethnic  joke  in  a  play  by  David
Mamet."4  Quickly  the  reader  learns  that  the  narrator  is  an  Indian
woman,  at  the play  with a man  from  Budapest;  reviewing  an  insulting
line  in the play about  Indian women,  the character speculates  that per-
haps the actors improvise and rotate ethnic insults depending  on the day
of the  week,  or  whom  they  happen  to spy  in  the  audience  on  a  given
night.' 5  The  narrator  thinks  of protesting,  or walking  out, but  recalls
that after attending expensive girls'  schools, "My manners  are exquisite,
my  feelings  are  delicate,  my  gestures  are  refined,  my  moods  undetect-
Kennedy's Racial Critiques  of  Legal Academia, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1745  (1989),  which characterized
and challenged  claims by other  legal scholars of color that membership  in a racial  minority affords
special  claims of authority and  knowledge.  See Symposium:  Responses, 103 Harv. L. Rev.  (1990).
For  an  especially  thoughtful  guide  to  the  contested  terrain  over  knowledge  and  identity,  see
Katharine  Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods,  103  Harv.  L. Rev.  829  (1990)  (contrasting  rational/
empirical,  experiential,  agnostic,  and  positional  theories  of  knowledge  used  by  contemporary
feminists).
13.  Bharati  Mukherjee,  A  Wife's  Story,  in  The  Middleman  and  Other  Stories  23  (1989).
Mukherjee  was born in Bombay, received  a Ph.D. at the University of Iowa, and teaches writing at
several  New  York universities.
14.  Id., at  25.
15.  Id., at  26.
[Vol.  3: 97
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able."' 6  Thus, Mukherjee's story from the start introduces a strong sense
of ethnic identity both as a given and  as a basis for the constant  risk of
ridicule.  The story also suggests the suppression  of real identity, desire,
and feelings through external training and internal control.  The self-con-
scious narrator knows that her sensitivity to insult is contingent and situ-
ational.  She sees both sides, that of the old colonizer and that of the new
pioneers.17  "Postcolonialism  has made me their referee.  It's hate I long
for;  simple, brutish,  partisan hate."'"  But  a  simple and uncomplicated
stance  is  not  readily  available  in  this world  of shifting  and  negotiated
relationships.
The story includes many references to assimilation as a goal, a tempta-
tion, and an impossibility.  The narrator's roommate is an Asian woman
who  recently  had  plastic  surgery  to  have  "her  eyes  fixed."' 9  As  the
roommate discusses  with the narrator  her  current crisis in  a love  rela-
tionship, the narrator puts away her silk sari, plans to brew some tea, and
thinks of the man who gave  them the  tea.  He  is her roommate's  uncle
who  once worked  for the railways  in Szechuan  Province  and who was
shot at,  once, during  the  Wuchang  Uprising.  The  narrator  notes that
when she is lonely for her husband and son whom she left back in India,
she thinks of this uncle.  "If I hadn't left home,  I'd never have  heard of
the  Wuchang  Uprising.  I've broadened  my  horizons."'2  The  narrator
has traveled half the world to work for a Ph.D. in special education,  and
she  compares  herself  with  her  mother  who  sought  to  learn  French
despite the violent opposition  of her own  mother-in-law.2'
The  narrator's  husband  calls  to  say  he  is  coming  to  visit  her from
India.  Memories  of her  long-ago  hopes  for  marriage  mingle  with  her
mixed  feelings for the man she married by traditional arrangement-the
man  she still  does  not  call  by  his  first name.22  She  greets  him  at the
airport,  and  he  asks  why  she  is  not  wearing  his  mother's  ring.  She
answers  that it is not  safe in a city with muggers.  She does not say that
she  thinks  the  ring is  "showy,  in  ghastly  taste  anywhere  but India."23
She notes her husband's  discomfort  in a setting  where she knows more
than he does.  He is  "used  to a different  role." 24
But  he  adjusts  to his new  role  as  tourist.  He  delights  in American
foods,  from the Perdue chickens to McNuggets.  They take a sightseeing
tour.  He  shifts  between  excitement  and  disappointment  in  relation  to
images of America  he had hoped  to see.  He says his wife, our narrator,
16.  Id.,  at 27.
17.  Id., at  27.
18.  Id.
19.  Id., at  29.
20.  Id., at  31.
21.  Id., at  29.
22.  Id., at  32.
23.  Id., at  33.
24.  Id.
1991]
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should return to India because the men in America are not to be trusted,
and he  misses  her.  She  says  "Special  ed.  course  is  two  years"  and  "I
can't go back."25  Later, he receives a cable calling him back to India to
help deal with a labor dispute at his company.  She prepares to make love
with him, and "pretend with him that nothing has changed."  But some-
thing  has.
The narrator's identity has changed.  It is not a given.  She is different
in America from who she was at home. Her difference  gives her a differ-
ent  vantage point on her husband;  he is a tourist, she is not.  When her
husband wants to see Radio City Music Hall, he does not catch the sym-
pathetic  wink  from  her  Hungarian  friend.  The  narrator  then  feels
"[g]uilt,  shame, loyalty.  I  long to  be ungracious,  not ingratiate  myself
with both men."26  She is already in a different relationship with her hus-
band.  She is both protective in a new way and distant enough from him
to  receive a private and  condescending communication  about him  from
another man.  She sees herself as someone trained to comply and to give
others,  especially  men,  what  they  want  and  expect.  Yet  she  also  has
developed  desires that resist her training. 27
She soothes her husband as he complains about things, such as the cost
of the sightseeing tour.  She thinks, "He  is not accusing me of infidelity.
I  feel dread  all  the same."2  In order to believe  that he is not accusing
her of infidelity,  she must first consider the possibility  that perhaps  her
independence  amounts to a  rejection  of him  for other  more ambiguous
loyalties.
She  experiences  herself as someone with a beautiful  body,  waiting for
her husband to come to bed that last night of his visit.  She is "shameless,
in ways he has never seen me."  And she is "free, afloat, watching some-
body else."29  Her  very bodily  self is  different  in this  different  country
where  she  is  getting  a  degree  in  special  education.30  Her  identity  is
neither constant  through  time  nor fixed  across  relationships.  Her  own
relationship with herself can  and does  change.
Other stories, such as Philip Roth's "Defender  of the Faith,"  similarly
depict ways in which identities are not fixed and essential but negotiated
and  mutually  constructed  within  patterns  of  assigned  and  challenged
roles.3  Roth  describes  an  army  sergeant,  Nathan  Marx,  who  is  reas-
25.  Id., at 39.
26.  Id.,  at  34.
27.  The story does not suggest that emotions or moods are any  more "authentic"  or free  from
external influence than are any  other feature of identity, such as role or sense of group membership.
Yet tensions  between emotions  and role provide  clues  to  a shifting sense of identity.
28.  Id., at 40.
29.  Id.
30.  Although this degree certainly exists and concerns education for people with disabilities, the
author could well mean something more specific about the special education the narrator is receiving
about herself.
3 1.  Philip Roth, Defender of the Faith, in How We Live:  Contemporary Life in Contemporary
[Vol.  3:  97
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signed to a training camp in Missouri  after serving two years in battle in
World  War II.  A  trainee  named Grossbart  approaches  him just  after
Marx's  arrival  to  request  help for  Jewish  soldiers  who  want to  attend
religious  services  on Friday  nights  but who  also  do not want the  other
soldiers  to think  this  an  excuse to  avoid  the  weekly  barracks  cleaning
scheduled  for  Friday nights.  The trainee  tries to establish that Marx is
also Jewish.  Marx at first resists the identification,  and then accepts  it.
He shows  no  intention  to help  the Jewish  trainees,  but  in fact he  does
smooth the way  for them by talking with the Captain.  Marx then finds
himself walking to the Friday night services where he sits in the back row
and watches the trainees from his company.  He notices that Grossbart is
entirely disengaged  from the religious ritual.
Grossbart  wheedles  Marx  for  more  favors,  including  assistance  in
obtaining  Kosher  food and  a leave pass  to attend a  Passover Seder.  In
each instance  Marx at first resists, and then grants the favor.  He is most
moved by the almost  forgotten memories  of his own  childhood  and his
own family that are evoked by the young Jewish trainees.  But in Gross-
bart's case, the claims of religious  need are apparently  lies.  He returns
from the supposed Passover Seder with a Chinese egg-roll for Marx, and
a  story  about why  the  Seder  did  not  work out.  When  Grossbart  then
asks Marx to help him avoid combat duty overseas, Marx refuses, only to
find  that Grossbart  was  able  to pull  strings  with someone  else.  Marx
then uses his own position to pull strings.  He lies to another officer that
Grossbart  wants  to  see  combat  duty,  and  secures  a  reassignment  to
assure that he will.
The story is not unambiguous about Marx's motives.  Perhaps there is
some  vindictiveness,  some  anger  about  being  used  by  Grossbart,  and
being  claimed  as a co-religionist.  Perhaps Marx finally seeks to protect
the  truly  religious  Jews  from  the  bad  reputation  of  a  manipulative,
deceitful,  and self-interested  coward  like Grossbart.  In that way,  Marx
accepts  and  defends  his  own  identity  as  a  Jew.  The  end  of the  story
suggests  both  possibilities.  Marx  watches  the  trainees  learn  of  their
orders  to ship out;  he  hears Grossbart  weep,  swallow  hard,  and try to
accept his fate.  "And then, resisting with all my will an impulse  to turn
and  seek pardon for my vindictiveness,  I accepted  my own."32
Roth describes his story as "about  one man who uses his own religion,
and another's uncertain conscience, for selfish ends; but mostly it is about
this other man, the narrator,  who because of the ambiguities of being a
member  of his  particular  religion,  is  involved  in  a  taxing,  if mistaken,
Fiction 602  (1968).  The  story  also appears in Philip Roth, Goodbye,  Columbus  (1959).  Roth was
born in  New  Jersey;  he  obtained  an M.A.  from  the University  of Chicago,  and has  written many
novels  and short  stories addressing cultural conflicts of Jews  who  assimilated  to American culture
to varied degrees.
32.  Defender of the Faith, at 625.
1991]
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conflict of loyalties."3  The character of Marx is also involved in a con-
struction  of loyalties;  a process  of claiming,  resisting and  remaking  his
own identity.  Whatever it means to be a Jew, the meaning is contingent
on relationships  with other Jews and non-Jews,  and it depends  on  shift-
ing  affinities within and between both  groups.
Roth's  story  demonstrates  ways  in  which  people  remain interdepen-
dent  with others even  as they test out new  versions of themselves.  The
story also suggests how an identity is founded on both the views of others
and  the individual;  Marx  is  treated  as  a  Jew  by  his non-Jewish  fellow
officers and he is treated as a Jew by  the Jewish  trainees.  Both kinds of
treatment  influence his sense of himself as a Jew and, although he resists
both, in the course of that resistance,  he defines himself.
"Defender  of the Faith"  suggests the power that memory and history
can wield in the process of defining a person's identity even as the person
retains the ability to affirm or repress that identity.  The Jewish  trainees
are able to appeal  to Marx  in part because they  remind him of his own
past and  his own  family  and  experiences  that have remained  a part of
him even though he has put aside  all forms  of affiliation with  Judaism.
Marx feels  Grossbart  used their shared  Jewishness  to secure benefits  he
could  not  obtain  from  a  non-Jewish  officer.  Marx's  response,  making
sure that Grossbart is sent along with the other soldiers to combat duty,
reflects  a reconciliation  with his Jewish  identity and a personal  effort to
define it not as a primitive tribal loyalty, but  instead as his own sense  of
self and his values.  He composes  his  identity by  accepting his  heritage
and  by  choosing to act mindfully  of it.  Marx who thought  he had the
power as a soldier, a war hero, and an officer to abandon his Jewish iden-
tity, finds that the expectations of others and his own history vigorously
reassert themselves.  He manages nonetheless to retain to some degree his
ability to define  himself.
B.  Power and Identity
People vested  with little or no power may nonetheless exercise control
over  their  identities.  Individuals  craft  images  for  others  to  believe  in
while preserving a different inner self.  Sherley Ann Williams introduces
her story "Meditations  on History"  with this comment about herself dur-
ing the time she wrote it: "I  sought during this time to conform, only to
discover that even my attempts  at conformity  set me apart."34  Paradox
33.  Roth,  Writing About Jews, Commentary (Dec.  1963) (quoted  in  How We Live, Supra n. 31,
at 626).
34.  Sherley Ann  Williams, In Honor  ofFree Women, Meditations  on History, in Midnight  Birds
195,  196 (Mary  Helen  Washington ed.  1980).  She also wrote,  "I  try to elucidate  those elements in
our lives on which constructive  political changes,  those that do more than blackwash or femalize the
same old  power  structure,  can be  built."  Id., at  198.  Williams  reworked  the story  as  part of  her
novel,  Dessa  Rose  (1986).  Williams  did  graduate  studies  at  Howard  University  and  at  Brown
University,  but decided not  to pursue  a Ph.D. because  "I  didn't want to spend the rest of  my life
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offers insights  into experiences  of belonging and exclusion.  In  "Medita-
tions  on  History,"35  a  white  male  writer  in  1829  interviews  a  black
female  slave  whom he describes  as "a  wild and timorous  animal finally
brought to bay." 6  The woman was involved  in a slave uprising, but her
execution  is postponed  so that her pregnancy  can reach full term-and
her child can become the possession of the master.  She refuses to speak
to the writer who is researching the facts of the uprising and the ensuing
trial.  It is through his eyes that we see her, or who he thinks she is.  He
describes her as an animal and as someone casting spells.37  He notes that
she moans and sings in ways he does not understand, and even when she
responds  to his  questions she remains  incomprehensible. 3 "
The writer is impatient with the slave woman's refusal, or inability, to
answer  his questions  about  the motivations  behind  the  slave  revolt and
the events that led to the execution of nineteen people and punishment of
ten others.  To his irritation,  she does not look him in the eye,  and she
hums  "an  absurd,  monotonous  little  tune  in  a  minor  key"  over  and
over.39  She  tells of acts of resistance  by the African Americans  toward
their  masters.  She  is  curious  about  his  writing,  and  asks  why  he  is
recording what she says.  He assumes she is set at ease when he responds
that his book will be written "in  the hope of helping others to be happy in
the life that has been sent them to live."''  But, after talking a while, she
asks  if he really  thinks that what she says  will help  people be happy in
the life they are sent, and if so, then " 'Why I not be happy when I live it?
I  don't wann talk no more.'  ,,4
When  they  meet  again,  the woman  intones  her monotonous  melody
again.  It is Sunday, and the  writer reads from the Bible and asks her to
stop humming.  She says the song is about righteousness and heaven;  he
asks her  to  sing it and she  does,  which  pleases  him.  The  next day  he
resumes questioning her.  She responds initially, but returns to humming.
poring over  other  people's  work  and  trying  to explain  the world  thru  their eyes."  Sherley  Ann
Williams,  in  Midnight  Birds,  195,  198.  She has  published  works  of poetry,  fiction,  and  literary
criticism.
35.  One  critic  argues  that  Williams  takes  her  title  from  the  William  Styron's  note  at  the
beginning of The Confessions of Nat Turner: "'Perhaps  the reader will want to draw a moral from
this narrative,  but  it has  been my own  intention to re-create  a man  and his  era, and  to produce a
work  that  is  less  an  'historical  novel'  in  conventional  terms  than  a  meditation  on  history.'  "
Elizabeth Meese,  (Ex)Tensions: Re-Figuring  Feminist Criticism 136 (1990) (quoting William Styron,
The  Confessions of Nat Turner  ix (1967)).  Meese  comments:  "Surely  the moral  Williams  cares  to
draw differs from the one Styron, or many of her (white) feminist readers for that matter, must have
envisioned,  just  as  her  'meditations  on  history'--spoken  (of)  in  the  plural  and  from  an/other
perspective-take a radically  different  form and meaning  from his."  Id.
36.  Meditations on History, supra, note  34,  at 211.
37.  Id., at 213-14,  215.
38.  Id., at 225.
39.  Id., at 226.
40.  Id., at 231.
41.  Id.,  at  234.
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He realizes  that she is capable  of smiling and joking and even  sees that
she is pretty, but he still thinks her unintelligent  and like an animal.
The writer's attention quickly shifts when a posse is formed to locate a
settlement  of escaped slaves.  As he joins the posse,  the writer hears the
slave  woman singing again.  Before he departs, he chats with her, think-
ing  he will yet discover the origins  of the slave insurrection.  She is still
no help, however, which angers him.  The woman resumes her song, and
he leaves with the posse.  When he returns she has escaped with the help
of three black men who  had participated  in the uprising.  Beyond a cer-
tain point, no trace of her can  be found.
Mary Helen  Washington  comments  that  in the story  the  white  man
defines  the  slave  woman  as  "foreign,  different,  inferior,  non-white,  and
non-male."42  She continues, "We  finish the story, however, convinced of
her power, not his.  She learns enough about his psychology to engineer
his defeat.",43  She tricks him into thinking she is incompetent and crazy,
when  in fact she has been  planning her escape and,  through her songs,
communicating  the  plan  to  her  friends.  She  fashions  an  identity  that
plays  into his  prejudices  in order to purchase  time and  space  to secure
her freedom.  Williams imagines this brave and smart  slave woman  as a
means to craft a new history and a renewed  African-American  identity.
Renaming  and  reclaiming  experiences  of resistance,  Williams  recasts
images  of contemporary black women  in light of a reconstructed past.
44
Williams  suggests  that  people  who  lack  power can  nonetheless  find
space for free action by constructing identities that fulfill the expectations
of others  and  thus distract  them.  She  explores  how  people  with  little
power may also find latitude for action by creating expectations in others
or  by  remaking  their  own  desires  in  line  with  others'  expectations. 45
Some  works  of fiction  explore  how  people  with  relatively  more  power
may  nonetheless  find  their  identities  challenged  and  changed  by  the
actions  of those in their employ or below  their social station.
Flannery  O'Connor's  story  "The  Displaced  Person"'  is  a  complex
42.  Mary  Helen  Washington,  In  Pursuit of Our Own  History,  in  Midnight  Birds, xiii,  xxii
(1980).
43.  Id.
44.  She  dedicated  the  story to  Angela  Davis,  and prefaced  the story  with this  quotation from
Davis:  "The  myth  [of  black  matriarchy  and  the  castrating  black  female]  must  be  consciously
repudiated  as myth and the black  woman in  her true  historical  contours must be  resurrected.  We,
the black women of today,  must accept the full weight of a legacy  wrought in blood by our mothers
in chains..  .as heirs to a tradition of supreme perseverance  and heroic  resistance, we must hasten  to
take our place  wherever our people are forging on towards  freedom." Meditations  on History,  supra,
note  34, at 200 (quoting Angela Davis,  Reflections on the Black Woman's Role  in the Community
of Slaves)  (brackets  in the original).
45.  Cf. David  Leavitt,  Danny in  Transit, in  Family  Dancing 95  (1983)  (a  child learns  he can
avoid  adult demands  by throwing  tantrums and  then learns he  can claim  the choice pushed  upon
him-the choice of going  to boarding school-and  thereby  build his  own sense of dignity).
46.  Flannery  O'Connor,  The  Displaced Person,  in  Collected  Works  285  (1988).  Flannery
O'Connor, who attended Georgia State  College for  Women and  the writing program at University
of Iowa, spent most of her life in Georgia  and her fiction is often described as Southern  Gothic.  See
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evocation  of the world  of  a  Southern  farm  owned  by  a  white  woman
named Mrs.  McIntyre, the widow  of a  prominent judge.  She  runs her
farm with the help of a poor white family and two poor black men.  The
wife  in the poor  white  family,  Mrs. Shortley,  is  acutely  attuned to the
relative  status  of everyone  in  her  world;  she  listens to  Mrs.  McIntyre
complain about the "[p]oor white trash and niggers"  she has employed in
the past but  knows that  "[i]f  Mrs. McIntyre  had  considered  her trash,
they couldn't have talked about trashy people together." ' 47  Mrs. Shortley
elevates her own sense of self by joining with her boss, Mrs. McIntyre, to
condescend  toward others.48
Everything  changes with the arrival of the "Displaced  Person" and his
family-refugees  from  Poland  who  are  hired  by  Mrs.  McIntyre  and
whose presence disturbs Mrs. Shortley's sense  of place.  Indeed, over the
course of the story, the presence of the "Displaced  Person" and his fam-
ily shakes up everyone's  delicately interconnected sense of social standing
and  personal  worth  at  the  farm.  Right  from  the  start,  Mrs.  Shortley
notes how Mrs. McIntyre accords the Displaced Person and his family  a
special  greeting never given to other hired help.49  Mrs.  Shortley tries to
maintain  her  superiority  by  refusing  to  learn  how  to  pronounce
"Guizac,"  the family's name.  Instead, she  calls them the  Gobblehooks.
She imagines them as tainted by their foreign language and their contact
with a brutal war.  But Mr. Guizac proves to be an efficient and produc-
tive worker, and that simple fact jostles and then topples the positions of
everyone  else at the farm.
Before the Guizacs'  arrival  Mrs.  Shortley  had  imagined  herself as a
giant  angel  telling the  Negro  employees  that they  would  have  to  find
other  work  because  of the  changes  at  the  farm.  Now,  however,  she
realigns herself in relation  to the Negro workers  and imagines standing
up for them in case their jobs become threatened  by the efficient produc-
tivity of the European  arrival.50  Mrs. McIntyre  starts to "act  like some-
body  who  was  getting  rich  secretly  and  she  didn't  confide  in  Mrs.
Shortley the way she used to."' ' "  Mrs. Shortley comforts herself with the
old adage, "The devil you know is better than the devil you don't", 2 and
clings to  the  sense of herself as  someone her  boss knows, someone like
How  We  Live,  787  (Penney  Chapin  Hills  and  L.  Rust  Hills  eds.  1968).  When  referring  to the
African  Americans  in  the story, O'Connor uses the term  Negro, which  I will use  in the context of
this  story as  well.
47.  Id.,  at 293.
48.  She  is  irritated  by  the  "illogic  of Negro-thinking"  when  one  of  the  black  employees
questions Mrs.  Shortley about how a displaced  person has nowhere to go. 
" 'It  seem like they here,
though,'  the old man  said in  a reflective  voice.  'If they here,  they somewhere.'"  Id.,  at 290.
49.  Id.,  at 285.
50.  Id.,  at 298.
51.  Id., at 299.
52.  Id.
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her boss.  But  in the very  desperateness  of this claim to familiarity, she
reveals doubts about it and about  its durability.
Mrs. Shortley overhears Mrs. McIntyre tell the priest her plans to dis-
charge the Shortleys, and immediately rushes to pack up her family and
things  and  leave  the  farm."  As  they  race  off,  all  their  belongings
squeezed in the car with their children and themselves, her husband asks
where  were they going.  With  that question  drumming  in her ear,  Mrs.
Shortley  furiously  rearranges  the  belongings  in  the car.  "[T]hen  all  at
once her fierce expression faded into a look of astonishment and her grip
on what  she  had  loosened."54  Having  bolted  from the farm,  she loses
hold of who and where she is.
Back at the farm, Mrs. McIntyre tells Astor, the old Negro employee,
that she will  make do without the Shortleys.  Astor and Mrs. McIntyre
exchange  sentences  acknowledging  their bond  through  time  as the  two
people who see others come and go but who themselves stay on through
it all."  Mrs. McIntyre also emphasizes nonetheless that the Guizacs will
stay.  She  thereby  disturbs  Astor's  sense  of stability  and  security  of
place.
5 6
Mrs.  McIntyre  later  finds  Guizac  talking  with  the  younger  Negro,
Sulk, who  holds a  photo of a young  girl.  Guizac is  negotiating  a mar-
riage between  Sulk and Guizac's cousin.  Mrs. McIntyre thinks that the
girl in the photograph looks to be about twelve, although Guizac says she
is sixteen.  This  cousin  is  still waiting  in a  displaced  persons  camp  in
Europe.  The idea of an interracial  match  horrifies Mrs. McIntyre.  She
shrieks at Sulk, she goes to the house and cries, she sits motionless in the
office  of her  deceased  husband,  waiting  for strength.  She  goes  to  call
Guizac  a  monster for  planning to "bring  this poor innocent  child  over
here"  and  trying  "to marry  her to a half-witted  thieving black stinking
nigger!""  She looks at Guizac "as if for the first time."  He seems artifi-
cial and pasted together from pieces.  She tells him how impossible  such
a marriage would be,  how wrong it would be to excite the young black
man.  She cannot even listen as Guizac explains that his cousin has been
in the camp for three years, that her mother has died there.5"  Something
clicks  into  place, and  Mrs.  McIntyre  declares  that she cannot  run  her
farm without "my niggers"  but she can run it without Guizac, so he had
better  terminate  all  discussion  of the marriage  between  his  cousin  and
Sulk.  "This  is my place,"  she says.  "I  say who will come here and who
won't." 9  She later tells the priest that Guizac just does not fit in, and is
53.  Id.,  at  303.
54.  Id.,  at  305.
55.  Id.
56.  Id.,  at  307.
57.  Id.,  at  313.
58.  Id.,  at  314.
59.  Id.
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not her responsibility.'
Mr. Shortley  returns  to the  farm-and  Mrs.  McIntyre  realizes  how
much she  had missed  his wife.  But Mrs. Shortley  does  not return;  she
had died  of a stroke the  very  day  they  left the  farm.61  Mrs.  McIntyre
mourns her as if they had been relatives; she tells Mr. Shortley she plans
to discharge the Displaced Person and rehire Mr. Shortley.  She thinks of
herself as obliged to Mr. Shortley, as one of her own people,  as someone
who fought in the world war for  his country.62  But  she postpones  dis-
charging Guizac which irritates and dismays Mr. Shortley.  Mrs. McIn-
tyre  seems  weighted  down,  inattentive.63  She  has  nightmares;  she
worries  about the economic  costs of firing her  most productive  worker
and  the  emotional  difficulty  of  actually  discharging  someone.  For
although she has threatened  to do so in the past, she has never before let
anyone  go;  people have always  left on their own.64
Mrs.  McIntyre  starts  off to  fire  Mr. Guizac and  she  finds him  lying
under the tractor fixing it.  She watches Mr. Shortley drive another trac-
tor in front of it and brake it on an inclined ground.  Then, she watches
the brake slip and  the tractors collide, crushing Guizac.  In the seconds
in which this happens, she feels "her eyes and Mr. Shortley's eyes and the
Negro's  eyes  come  together  in  one  look  that  froze  them  in  collusion
forever."
65
Shocked  and  confused,  Mrs.  McIntyre  herself now  feels  like  a  for-
eigner, a stranger.66  Mr. Shortley soon thereafter leaves the farm, as does
Sulk.  Astor  will  not  work  alone.  Mrs.  McIntyre  sells  the  farm  and
becomes bedridden,  losing her sight and voice.67
In  the  course  of this  story, then,  the  introduction  of someone  from
outside  the social  hierarchy  and  someone  indifferent  to  its  rigid  rules
challenges  each  person's  relationships  to  the  others  so  much  that  the
relationships  crumble.  After first straining and then revising patterns of
loyalty  and  identification,  the  experience  undermines  Mrs.  McIntyre's
identity as owner and her place as mistress of the farm.  Her dependence
on Guizac already alters her sense of herself as someone in command, as
someone who could fire an employee, as someone who had never done so
and had now  to face a different  sense of herself.  She  loses her  position,
just as Mrs. Shortley does.  Each person  on the farm is displaced by  the
anxieties,  hopes, and  fears of the others.
60.  Id., at  316.
61.  Id., at  318.
62.  Id., at  319.
63.  Id., at  321.
64.  Id., at 322.
65.  Id., at 325-326.
66.  Id.,  at 326.
67.  A subtheme throughout the story  is her relationship with the priest, who  had sponsored the
Displaced  Person and who had consistently  tried to convert Mrs. McIntyre;  at the end of the story,
the priest becomes  Mrs. McIntyre's only  visitor. Id.,  at  327.
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To  negotiate  means  "to  hold  communication  or  conference  (with
another)  for  the  purpose  of  arranging  some  matter  by  mutual  agree-
ment";  it also means  "to  deal with  or manage."68  To treat  identity  as
something negotiated, as do these works of fiction, is to extend the theme
of interactions  into the exchange  between  author and reader.6 9  Merely
noticing the inevitable mutuality of meaning-the  contributions  of read-
ers  to  the meanings  of texts  and  of outsiders  to  the  meanings  of iden-
tity-should  not  supplant  needed  attention  to  the  patterns  of  social,
political,  and  economic  power within  which  people  relate.  These  pat-
terns  create  constraints  against  which  individuals may  push,  but  each
person is situated differently in relation to constraints.  Identities are not
stable, fixed or innate, but nor are they entirely mutable at the wishes of
anyone.  The weight of one's own experiences and social position and the
press  of others'  expectations  and  practices  stack the negotiations  over
identity.
II.  LAW  AND  IDENTITY
Questions  of identity crop  up as legal problems.  Some of these  ques-
tions  are quite  immediate  and seem  amenable  to scientific  or empirical
answers: who  is the father of the child?  Who is this woman's  husband?
Who is the owner of this property?  Yet, even the answers to these ques-
tions can be challenged and such contests reflect the significance of mutu-
ality,  negotiation,  and  complex  patterns  of power  relationships  within
which even simple matters of identity  take hold.
Courts  use blood tests and genetic  typing to establish  paternity.  But
the question of who is a child's "father"  reflects community rules about
marriage and parenthood, the child's own perceptions and feelings, and a
man's own acceptance  of the role.7"  Similarly,  societal rules, a woman's
desires  and a man's own  efforts  to take on  the identity  of another  can
create  a setting  for enormous  disagreement  over who  is  a husband,  as
68,  I  Compact  Edition of the Oxford English  Dictionary  1910 (1971).
69.  See generally Wayne  Booth,  The  Company  We Keep:  An Ethics of Fiction  (1984);  James
Boyd White, When Words Lose Their  Meaning (1988).
70.  For  an  analysis  of  community  rules  affecting  the  definition  of  fatherhood,  see  infra
(discussing  Michael  H.).  Proponents  of  psychological  notions  about  parent/child  bonds  have
introduced a concept of "psychological  parenthood"  which looks to the child's own perceptions and
feelings about who is the parent.  See, e.g., Joseph Goldstein,  Albert Solnit &  Anna Freud, Beyond
the Best Interests  of the Child (1973).  And the man's own  voluntary acceptance of the role means
more than engaging in the physical act that produced the child; the Supreme Court has held that for
purposes  of  asserting  due  process  rights  to  participate  in  an  adoption  proceeding  that  would
terminate his claims  about  a child,  an  unmarried  father  must  also have  undertaken  a  significant
custodial, personal, or financial relationship with the child.  Lehr v. Robertson,  460 U.S.  248  (1983).
Finally, whatever  commonsense or scientific definitions of fatherhood  may have worked in the past,
the advent  of new productive technologies  exposes  the  definition  of a father as a matter  of social
choice  from among  many  possible  candidates,  including  the  person  who donates  the sperm,  the
husband of the woman who carries the child, the man who seeks adoption or who has undertaken an
actual relationship with the child.  In short, communal definitions, the child's own participation, and
the man's  efforts can  all  contribute  to negotiations  over the identity of the father.
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Natalie  Zemon  Davis  explored  in  her  work,  The  Return of Martin
Guerre. 7  And so basic a legal question as who is the owner of property
can be enormously contested  not only by people claiming the same own-
ership rights, but also by people in relationships of reliance on or mutual-
ity  with the  owners.72
When lawyers and judges neglect the dynamic negotiations over ques-
tions  of  identity,  and  treat  identity  as  simply  something  that  exists
innately and can be uncovered,  they risk producing not only unfortunate
results,  but also  unconvincing  reasons  for the  results.  If lawyers  and
judges  treat  identity  as  something  discoverable  rather  than  forged  or
invented, they hide the latitude for choice and struggle over identity.  At
the  same  time  they  exercise  their  own  power  to  make  those  choices.
Lawyers and judges may defend themselves by declaring that they do not
decide questions of identity; they simply interpret and apply the law.  But
when  a critical  link in  the chain  of legal  reasoning  asserts  a  particular
meaning of identity, I challenge that defense.  The use of a specific notion
of identity to resolve a legal dispute can obscure the complexity of lived
experiences  while  imposing  the  force  of the  state  behind  the  selected
notion of identity.
Translation  into  legal  categories  and  attention  by  legal  authorities
transforms the law and lawyers themselves into additional participants in
the negotiations over identity.  Lawyers and judges need to pay attention
to their own contributions to the constraints  within  which the identities
of others are  negotiated  and  assigned.  In practice,  lawyers  and judges
also need to consider whether one person's presentation  of self is devised
to gain  an advantage,  and whether  another's  opposition  to the  claimed
identity similarly reflects self-interest.  Works of fiction such as those dis-
cussed  in  the last section  illuminate  how  it  is possible  to acknowledge
negotiations  over  identity  while also  recognizing  the larger  patterns  of
power and constraint that may undermine  an individual's  choice.
Legal preoccupation with identity may reflect society's increasing anx-
iety about its fragility.  Although questions of identity appear in biblical
stories and classical  Greek dramas,73  identity is in many ways a modern
71.  Natalie  Zemon Davis, The Return of Martin  Guerre (1983).  Even after the advent of social
security cards, finger-prints, and other techniques of identification, disputes over identity can become
complicated  where  an individual  takes on  more than  one  identity, and  forms  relationships  with
different groups of people who will vouch for him.  See Many Identities  Emerge for Amnesia  Victim,
N.Y. Times, March  14,  1990, A26 col.  I (amnesia victim  first identified  by family members as one
person and  then as two other people,  based on employment records  and  employee  reports despite,
three different social  security  numbers).
72.  See Joseph  William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 611,  663-699
(1988).
73.  Consider  the story  of Moses  and  his  response to discovering  that  he  was  not an Egyptian
prince  but  instead  an  abandoned  son  of Jewish  parents;  consider  the  story  of Oedipus  and  his
discovery  that his  wife was  his mother, and  his failure  to avoid  a foretold  destiny.
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preoccupation. 7 4  After  world wars, industrial dislocation  and exposure
to mass communications  people may have a greater sense of the mutabil-
ity  of their  identities.  Encounters  with  people  of more  varied  ethnic,
racial, religious and class backgrounds  challenge an individual's sense  of
self  and  community."  Perhaps  identity  becomes  important  when  it
becomes  a  question,  and  it  becomes  a  question  when  individuals  and
groups  are  mobile  and  able  to  change  some  of their  identifying  traits.
When  people  come into  frequent  contact  with  others unlike  themselves
they can both heighten and  submerge their sense of distinctiveness. 76
Lawyers  and judges  who  address  legal  questions  of identity  should
keep in mind its kaleidoscopic nature.  They should examine the multiple
contributions given to any definition of identity.  They ought to examine
the  pattern  of power  relationships  within  which  an  identity  is  forged.
And  they  need  to  explore  the  pattern  of power  relationships  within
which a question of identity is framed.  Where people debate the identity
of others,  it is  important  to  consider  the contrast  between  choice  and
assignment.  Who picks a given  identity, and who  is consigned to it?
A.  Identity, History, and Anthropology: The Mashpee Case
Lawyers  and  judges  might  find  instruction  in  the  debates  among
anthropologists.  Anthropologists  currently  engage  in  debates  over  the
field's  methods  and  purposes.  Anthropologists  know  that they cannot
avoid  influencing  the identities  of the  cultures  they  describe.  Contact
with  outsiders  can  change  a  group's  sense  of itself.  A current  debate
about the authenticity of the traditional  tales of origin told by the Maori
of New  Zealand exposes  the complex  effects  of prior contacts with  out-
siders.  Some  evidence  suggests  that European  anthropologists  contrib-
uted  to  the tales  of origin  elaborated  by  the  Maori.  Members  of the
Maori argue that whatever  the source of their story  of origin,  it is now
their story.77  Objective  description  seems impossible to anthropologists
who know that they have their own points of orientation that differ from
those they describe and they understand that the stability of any individ-
ual  or  group identity  seems  at  risk  of disruption,  change,  and  growth
74.  See  generally  William  Barrett,  Irrational  Man  (1960)  (discussing  modernity  and
existentialism).
75.  On the other hand, in the United States  it is probably more difficult to abandon one identity
and  take on  another  now than in  the  days before  social security  numbers and  before  the Western
territories  became states.
76.  See James Clifford, The Predicament  of Culture  (1988)  (exploring post-colonial  contexts  of
debate  over identity  especially  in  light  of the  effect  of prior  intercultural  contacts  on  any  given
group's sense of itself).  See also Anthony Cohen, The Symbolic Construction of Community (1985).
77.  John Noble Wilford, Anthropology Seen as Father  of Maori Lore, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20,  1990,
C1  col.4,  C12  col.l.  Besides  reviewing  this particular  debate,  the  article  discusses  contemporary
examinations of anthropology  itself and the  mutual effects  of anthropologists  and the cultures  they
study; the article discusses the work of Allan  Hanson, James Clifford, George Marcus, and Clifford
Geertz.  See also Clifford  Geertz, Works  and Lives:  Anthropologist  as  Author  (1988).
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through contact  with an observer.7"
James  Clifford  writes  extensively  about  the  interaction  between  cul-
tures  and  between  anthropologists  and  the  peoples  they  study.  He
found-or created-in  the  litigation over Mashpee  Indian land  rights a
marvelous case study for his thesis that culture reflects a process of trans-
plantation, translation, and transmutation.  His work explicitly addresses
the contingency  of identity and the important contributions  of observers
and  their own  perspectives  to  what  they  know  about  the  identities  of
others.79
For  example,  Clifford  summarizes  the  lawsuit  over  16,000  acres  of
land  in  which  members  of  the  Mashpee  community  challenged  land
transfers occurring since the  18th century as a violation of federal law.80
To prevail, the plaintiffs  had to establish that they were  the descendants
of a tribe and that they remained members of a viable tribe with a contin-
uous  existence.  Clifford  describes  how  the  lawsuit  presented  two  ver-
sions  of the  history  of Mashpee  tribal  status.  According  to  one  view,
there  never  was  a  tribe.81  People  from  varied  Indian  tribes  and  other
minority groups settled  in the area and intermarried  with whites.  They
sought  full  citizenship  in  Massachusetts  and  in  the United  States  and
pursued assimilation  into American  culture.  Most of the  residents con-
verted to Christianity  during the course of the  18th  century.  Through a
period of political changes, Mashpee became a town.  Its early legal form
as  a  collective  plantation  prevented  sales  and  purchases  of  individual
plots of land.  During the  19th century these initial restraints  on alienat-
ing land prompted debates over reform.  By  1870 the state legislature had
abolished the special restrictions  and transfers of land to outsiders began
and continued for the next  100 years.  Although Mashpee citizens  show
an  attachment  to  their  ethnic  heritage,  they  do not  represent  a  tribe.
Instead, they  are descendants  of an eclectic  group of Native American,
black,  and white  people  who lived in the Mashpee area. 2
Clifford summarized  the alternative  history also presented at trial.  In
this narrative, the very  idea of "tribe"  is a historical invention by whites
and reflects the organizational forms imposed by white America's regula-
tion of Indians during the  19th century.  Traits of political organization,
78.  See  Geertz, supra, at  144:  "The moral  asymmetries  across  which  ethnography  works and
the  discursive complexity within  which it works make any attempt to portray it  as anything  more
than  the representation  of one sort of life  in  the categories  of another impossible to defend."
79.  James  Clifford,  supra note  76.
80.  Id.,  The Non-Intercourse  Act of 1790  protected  tribal  groups  from exploitation  by  whites
who  sought  to purchase  tribal  lands  without  full  compensation.  The  Act  required  Congressional
approval  before the alienation of Indian  lands.  In the context  of a suit by  the Passamaquoddy and
Penobscot  Indians  in Maine, the tribes received  over $80 million  and  authority to acquire properties
as an  out-of-court  settlement.  See  Paul  Brodeur,  Restitution:  The  Land  Claims  of the  Mashpee,
Passamaquoddy,  and Penobscot  Indians of New England  (1985).
81.  Clifford, supra note 76,  at  294-302.
82.  See  also  Francis  Hutchins,  Mashpee:  The  Story  of  Cape  Cod's  Indian  Town  (1979).
Hutchins  served  as the chief expert witness in the  trial  on behalf of the defendants.
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religious identity, kinship, and distinctive culture are important to whites
who classify Indians, not to Indians themselves.  Thus, outsiders saw the
retention of collective land ownership in Mashpee long after other Cape
Cod  towns had  abandoned  it as a  sign of backwardness,  while  insiders
considered it an important device for preserving traditions in the midst of
changing times. 8 3
The tribe's version of Mashpee  history treats conversion  to Christian-
ity as no abandonment  of Indian identity  because the Native Americans
view  religion  inclusively  and  pragmatically.  This  account  emphasizes
that most of the  Christian  ministers  in  Mashpee  have  identified  them-
selves as Indians. The churches in fact played a role in preserving a sense
of cultural  heritage  in  Mashpee.  Intermarriage  between  Indians  and
non-Indians  does  not  represent  assimilation  into mainstream  American
culture  but  instead  the  capacity  of  the  Mashpee  to  absorb  outsiders.
Most importantly,  the  group  continuously  saw  itself as  a group  apart.
The leaders of the town and its citizens maintained a continuous presence
on the same land for several hundred years.  They claimed the identity of
"Indian"  even  when  it hurt  them  in the  larger  community.  They  pre-
served traditions  and passed on  their history  to succeeding  generations
even while appearing to assimilate to the dominant  white culture.  When
they revived  aspects of traditional  culture after periods of de-emphasiz-
ing them, the Mashpee did not fabricate their identity but instead demon-
strated  the importance  of choice in reaffirming  identity. 4  This point is
echoed in  Philip Roth's  story  about an  assimilated  Jewish  army  officer
who reaffirms  his religious  identity  after a period of assimilation.85
As Clifford  portrays  the  Mashpee  Indian  trial,  the Mashpee  identity
reflected multiple sources and contributions  from inside and outside the
community.  Clifford  notes  how  the  power  relationships  within  which
people construct identities complicate any decision about the tribal status
of the  Mashpee.  For example,  Clifford  contrasts two  interpretations  of
the records of a town debate  in 1869  over whether to end all restrictions
on land sales.  In one interpretation, the town members  sought assimila-
tion and only disagreed  about the timing of changes that would bring it
about.  Those  who  favored  quick  change  rejected  the  paternalism  and
second-class  status  embodied  in  state  restrictions  on  sales  of  Indian
lands; those who opposed  sudden change feared losing their community.
One leader said the community needed another generation before it could
responsibly  exercise the  freedom  to sell land.8 6  The town voted  against
83.  Clifford, supra note 76,  at  305.
84.  Id.,  at  285-293.
85.  See supra text  accompanying  note 31  (discussing Defender of the Faith).
86.  Clifford, supra note  76, at  299. This view  comported with an  attitude  held  by many  whites
and  embodied  in  the  Dawes  Act.  See Leonard  A. Carlson,  Indians,  Bureaucrats,  and  Land: The
Dawes Act and the Decline of Indian  Farming 4 (1981)  (describing legislation that allocated  Indian
reservation  lands to individual  Indians in an effort to encourage "each  family to farm its own land
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eliminating  the  land  restrictions,  but  the  discussions  indicated  wide-
spread agreement that their removal should be a future community  goal.
Yet, the tribe's interpretation of the  1869 town debate maintained that
"public  arguments about Mashpee's 'immaturity'  should be seen as ways
of  addressing  an  outside  audience,  the  Massachusetts  General  Court,
which still thought of the plantation as a ward of the state and which had
already  decided and again  would arbitrarily decide  its fate.  It would be
impolitic in addressing this body to say that Mashpee rejected full town-
ship status in the name of a distinctive  vision of Indian community  and
citizenship.  An argument for delay  couched in paternalist  rhetoric was
more  likely to succeed."87  Just as  a slave woman  in Sherley  Williams'
story could find latitude for movement by playing upon a white journal-
ist's stereotype of her identity, these Native Americans could make space
for their continued existence by playing into white expectations of Indian
immaturity and desire to assimilate. 88  Attention to the ways people with
little  power  can deploy  notions  of identity  and  gain  some  control over
their lives complicates  interpretations of the Mashpee population's iden-
tity. If the Mashpee leaders manipulated  white preconceptions  in order
to prolong their  distinctive  community,  the Massachusetts  legislature's
decision to remove restrictions on the Mashpee lands in  1870 is not nec-
essarily evidence of the tribal status of the Mashpee at that time, or later.
The case of the Mashpee underlines two levels for understanding  iden-
tity.  The first involves the mutual constructions  by insiders and outsid-
ers;  the  second  emphasizes  the impact  of unequal  power relationships.
Signs of assimilation by a group treated as less powerful than the major-
ity deserve a second look because they may indicate subtle acts of resist-
ance  and  accommodation  by  people  seeking  to  retain an  independent
identity  without risking  conflict  or  further suppression.  When  identity
becomes  a  legal issue,  the legal institutions  add another  layer of power
relationships  to  the  dynamic  between  majority  and  minority  groups.
Asked  to decide  whether  the Mashpee  were  a tribe, 9  the jury of non-
Indians  itself sat in  a position  of power not  only  in the context  of the
broader social and political context of American life but also in the con-
text of the lawsuit.
The jury rejected  the plaintiffs'  claim that a tribe, under  federal law,
existed continuously  from the period  before the colonies through  1976.
But the jury also rejected the defendants' claim that there had never been
and  acquire  the  habits  of  thrift, industry,  and  individualism  needed  for  assimilation  into  white
culture.").
87.  Id.,  at  308.  In  this  interpretation,  the  town  members  showed  how  well  they  knew  the
attitudes of the white  politicians about  the  Mashpee,  and  played  off of those  attitudes in  order  to
purchase the space and  autonomy for pursuing  their own vision  of governance.
88.  See supra, text accompanying  note 44.
89.  The federal  district  court judge  asked the jury to answer  whether a tribe  existed in  1790,
1834,  1842,  1869,  1870,  and  1976  because  these  were  critical  dates  in  the  history  of  Mashpee
pertinent to the land  claims.  Clifford, at 333.
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tribe.9°  Yet  the jury's resistance  to  accept  either  interpretation  entirely
may  also  reflect  discomfort  with  the  notion of "tribe,"  especially  as  a
concept  defined by  whites  to describe  and  regulate nonwhites.9'  Or the
jury's decision  may  express  uneasiness  with  the pretense  of a  singular
history,  given  the  contradictory  narratives  offered  by  witnesses.  By
refusing  to define  the tribe in one way, the jury thus may have acknowl-
edged what its members probably knew about themselves:  identities can
change  and  still  represent  important  continuities  with  the  past.  This
insight  animates  Mukherjee's  story about  the  woman  from  India  who
experiences  a  shift in identities while  studying  in the United  States and
yet another  shift when  her husband comes  to  visit.92
The question of people's identity will forever be befuddling if detached
from the purposes for which  the question is being asked.  Once the pur-
poses are disclosed, the perspective  of the inquirer, the perspective of the
evaluator, the perspective of the community, and in some cases, self-pro-
claimed  identity become  critical.  Neither  perceptions  by  outsiders  nor
claims of insiders are "objective."  Each reflects  interests and a position,
a  perspective.  If the  purpose  of asking  about  the  tribal  status  of the
Mashpee is to determine  whether the plaintiffs should obtain compensa-
tion for past land sales or protection  against future land sales, that pur-
pose  is  cut  off from  consideration  by  an  intervening  question:  are  the
Mashpee  a  tribe?  Talking  about  the  objectives  in  the  case  directly
exposes questions  of power, politics, and justice, but these are in fact the
same questions  embedded  in descriptions and assessments  of identity.
B.  Identity, Family, and Presumptions: Michael  H. v. Gerald D.
Sometimes  legal  rules are designed  to close  off discussion-to  cut off
some inquiries  based on the view that certainty may  be more important
than truth or even more important than fairness.  For example, legal pre-
sumptions, especially  those that are irrebuttable,9a  work by a  legal rule
that states that proof of x  shall be deemed  to be proof of y.  If the  pre-
sumption is irrebuttable no amount of contrary  evidence about not-y can
make a difference  to the  legal conclusion.94
90.  The jury found  that no  tribe existed  in  1670,  but a tribe  existed in  Mashpee  in  1834 and
1842.
91.  The relationship between  an assigned name  and a chosen identity can be quite complex.  One
observer  described  it  this  way:  "The  program  of  naming  and  unnaming  takes  the  following
historically determinate  steps (different  phases  of  a development  sequence):  ethnic  reality  realizes
that it has  a  "name,"  but  this name  is  forced  on  it  by  the oppressor,  that  is,  it is  the victim  of
representation; it achieves a revolution  against both the oppressor and the discourse of the oppressor
and proceeds to unname itself through a process  of inverse displacement;  it  gives itself a name, that
is, represents  itself from within  its own  point  of view;  and  it  ponders  how best  to legitimate  and
empower  this  new  name."  R.  Radhakrishnan,  Ethnic Identity and Post-Structuralist  Difference,
Cultural Critique  199,  208  (1987).
92.  See supra, at text accompanying  note  13.  (discussing  A  Wife's Story).
93.  Such  presumptions  are also sometimes  called  "conclusive."
94.  See Michael H. v. Gerald D.,  109 S.Ct. 2333,  2340 (1989)  (Scalia, J.,  plurality opinion) ("A
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Questions  of  identity-for  legal  purposes-are  sometimes  handled
through an  irrebuttable  presumption.  For example,  many states  have  a
rule that a child born to a married woman who lives with her husband  is
presumed to be the child of the husband.9" Such a rule may reflect a goal
of eliminating  uncertainty  about the  parentage of children  born to mar-
ried people and also  an aim  of reducing the chances that husbands may
refuse  to  accept  paternity,  including  support  obligations,  when  their
wives  have children.  It may also stem  from a time when  paternity  was
difficult  to  establish  and  when  illegitimacy  stigmatized  children  and
deprived  them  of inheritance  rights.96  Either set  of goals  could  be  re-
examined  in light of changing cultural  and technological  developments
affecting  parentage.  For example,  advances  in the  technology  of blood
tests  to  establish  paternity  could  render obsolete  the  premise  that  the
presumption  solves  an  otherwise  protracted  question.97  A  conclusive
presumption forecloses  any such reconsideration.9"
The Supreme Court  faced a  challenge  to a presumption of legitimacy
in Michael H. v. Gerald D.9 9  There, Carole gave birth to Victoria while
married  to Gerald;  Carole  told  Michael  she thought  he was  the father
and blood tests showed  a  98.07%  probability  of that fact which  Carole
never contested.  Carole and her husband spent time apart.  Carole spent
some of that time with Michael, and Michael treated the child as his own
during some periods; during some periods they lived together as a family.
Carole  returned  ultimately  to  Gerald,  and  Michael  sought  visitation
rights.  Based on the arguments of an attorney and guardian  ad litem for
the child, and on the evaluation of a psychologist, a court ordered limited
visitation  rights  for Michael  during  the  litigation.  Meanwhile,  Gerald,
the husband, successfully  sought to terminate  the litigation on the basis
of the conclusive presumption  in California law  that the child born to a
cohabiting  married  couple is the offspring  of the marriage.
conclusive  presumption  does,  of  course,  foreclose  the  persona  against  whom  it is  invoked  from
demonstrating, in a particularized proceeding,  that applying the presumption  to him will in fact not
further  the lawful  governmental  policy the presumption is designed to  effectuate.")
95.  E.g.,  Cal.  Evid.  Code  Ann.  sec.  621  (West  Supp.  1989).  The  California  rule does  allow
rebuttal only within two years after the child's birth, and then, only at the request of the husband or
wife,  not a third party.  Sec. 621  (c), (d).
96.  The California statute was enacted  in 1872.  109 S.Ct., at 2338.  A similar rule was part of the
common  law  tradition.  E.g.,  I  Blackstone's  Commentaries  456  (Chitty  ed.  1826).  Although
illegitimacy  may still  be  a stigma  in  some  communities,  by  law,  it is  not  a permissible  basis for
denying  a child  inheritance  and succession  rights.  Lalli  v.  Lalli,  439  U.S.  259  (1978);  Trimble  v.
Gordon,  430  U.S.  762  (1977).  Similarly,  the  constitution  has  been  interpreted  to  assure  some
protected  parental  relationship  for  unwed  fathers.  See  Stanely  v.  Illinois,  405  U.S.  645  (1972);
Caban  v.  Mohammed, 441  U.S.  380  (1979).
97.  See  Little  v.  Streater,  452  U.S.  1, 6  (1981)  (examining  changes  in  blood test  accuracy).
Moreover,  the  1872 statute  was  amended  several  times.  See  Michael  H.  v.  Gerald  D.,  109  S.Ct.
2333,  2339  (1989).
98.  There  may  indeed  be  a  problem  of  infinite  regress  here:  if  the  presumption  forecloses
consideration  of alternative  evidence  in  a  given  case,  does  it also  foreclose  consideration  of the
presumption  itself, and  then consideration  of the consideration  of the presumption?
99.  109  S.Ct. 2333  (1989).
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Michael pursued on appeal  a constitutional challenge to the presump-
tion  as  a violation  of both  his right  to procedural  due  process  and his
protected liberty interest in his relationship with the child.  In a plurality
opinion for the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia wrote, "California  law, like
nature itself, makes no provision  for dual fatherhood.""U °  By invoking
nature, Justice Scalia treated the presumption  as inevitable and immuta-
ble-as  beyond  reconsideration.  The  plurality  opinion  also  rejected
Michael's  arguments more  specifically t"t  but  this  introductory  remark
sets the tone for the analysis.  Identity is treated in the opinion as natural,
discoverable,  and unable to be changed.  Even when acknowledging  that
alternative understandings  of family identities  are possible, the plurality
converts  the  issue  into  one  that  can  be  answered  by  reference  to  an
unchanging  source  of evidence:  "the  historic  practices  of our  society"
which  recognize a protected family  unit.12  The plurality's approach  is
intended to reduce  disputes and to treat the judicial inquiry as one read-
ily answered  by pre-existing traditions. t0 3
In  pursuit  of that  purpose,  the  plurality's  approach  exemplifies  the
mistaken view that identities are fixed and knowable, rather than contin-
gent  and  capable  of  change.  Perhaps  Justice  Scalia's  opinion  never
intended to speak to the nature of identities,  and only meant  to preserve
the timesaving device  of a conclusive  presumption.  Yet, the plausibility
of the  presumption  in question  depends  upon  popular  as  well  as  legal
conceptions  of the identity  of a  father.  By  referring  to  tradition  and
nature,  Justice Scalia himself turns to popular and historical  notions of
fatherhood.  The plurality opinion  also  neglects  the varied  sources  of a
father's identity.  Besides or even instead  of biological  connection to the
child, the father may have an emotional relationship, a financial responsi-
bility,  or  a set of caretaking  functions.  Treating  as  conclusive  the pre-
100.  109  S.Ct., at  2339.
101.  Justice  Scalia  rejected  the  procedural  due  process  objection  on  the  ground  that  the
presumption  did not deny  Michael procedures  but instead  represents  a classification  that survives
review as to the  fit between its terms and its  purposes.  109 S.Ct., at 2341.  The opinion  also rejected
Michael's  claim  that the presumption  violated  his constitutionally  protected  liberty  interest  in a
relationship  with his daughter on the ground that only fundamental liberties are protected, and that
only traditional family ties  fall within  that sphere of protection.  Id., at  2341-2345.
102.  109  S.Ct.,  at 2342.  In  stressing this  look at  specific  historical  traditions, Justice  Scalia's
analysis bears consequences  for the entire project of judicial interpretation, especially of terms such
as  due  process  and  liberty.  Justice  Scalia's  effort  to clarify  this  historical  test  prompted  sharp
dissents  even  from  Justices  O'Connor  and  Kennedy,  who otherwise joined  his opinion,  109  S.Ct.
2346 (O'Connor and Kennedy,  JJ., concurring in part), as well as  from the dissenting justices.  109
S.Ct. 2349  (Brennan, J., joined by  Marshall, J.,  and  Blackmun,  J.,  dissenting).  See  also  109 S.Ct.
2360 (White, J.,  dissenting).
103.  This  dimension  of  the  plurality  prompted  especially  sharp  dissents  from  Justices  who
argued  in  contrast  that  the  Constitution's  meaning  should  evolve  in relation  to  changing  social
practices  and attitudes.  109  S.Ct.,  at  2349,  2349-2351  (Brennan,  J.,dissenting); Id., at  2360, 2360-
2361  (White, J.,  dissenting).  See also Loving  v.  Virginia,  388  U.S.  1 (1967)  (rejecting  state  law
forbidding  interracial  marriage  as  unconstitutional  burden  on  fundamental  liberty);  Stanely  v.
Illinois,  405  U.S.  645  (1972)  (rejecting  presumption  that  unwed  father  is  unfit  caretaker  for  his
children).
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sumption that the husband of the mother is the father of the child allows
the plurality to reinforce structures of social and institutional power that
have  selected  some  family  forms  as  preferable  and  thus  recognizable.
Most importantly, the plurality  seeks to cover its own tracks  despite its
critical  power to choose  what  kind of family  roles to  permit, and  even
what  kinds of debates over family  roles to countenance.
The plurality thus hides behind  a historical  test to identify  the tradi-
tional  family  forms  that are  entitled  to  constitutional  protection.  This
test for answering questions about family is faulty in part because it dis-
guises  the exercise  of legal  power  in  the  fiction  of a  discoverable  past.
Histories of extended  families', households',  and subgroups'  experiences
render  problematic Justice Scalia's basic notion that "family"  has had  a
stable  meaning  even  within  Anglo-American  culture  over  time. t °4
Changing  patterns of divorce  and remarriage and  apparently  increasing
births of children outside  of marriage makes  the emphasis  on a nuclear
family with one father  and one mother less and less germane to the lives
of real  people living today. 105
Moreover,  within any given period of time, family roles have acquired
meaning through a complex  process of interpretation by  the people who
fill  them.  "06 Family identities are unavoidably  relational.  The woman  in
Muhkerjee's  story developed  a new identity  while living apart  from her
husband,  and  shaped  still  another  while spending  time  with  him  in  a
world  she knew  better than he did.  The very  meaning  of her status as
"wife"  changed in the course of these experiences  in relation to her hus-
band and to other people.  Similarly, a woman is a mother in relation to a
child;  a  boy  is  a  brother  in  relation  to  a  sibling;  they  are  a  family  in
relation to one another.  None of these relationships is intrinsic to a sin-
gle person;  each  depends  upon the patterns  of connection  between  indi-
104.  See,  e.g.,  Steven  Mintz,  A  Prison  of Expectations:  The  Family  in  Victorian Culture  14
(1985)  ("Demographic  historians  have  found  that  while  in the  seventeenth  and  early  eighteenth
centuries in England and colonial America the nuclear household (i.e.,  a husband and wife living in a
private,  independent  household)  was predominant,  most people, at  least in their youth, lived  for a
time in  more complex households, as a servant, an apprentice,  a trade assistant, or a boarder"). See
also Carol Stack,  All Our Kin  (1974)  (exploring  kin  relationships among  unrelated  people  within
poor  Black communities);  Lawrence  Stone,  The Family,  Sex  and  Marriage  in  England  1500-1800
100-108  (Abridged  ed.  1979)  (exploring transition  from extended  family  to nuclear  family forms);
Carol Weisbrod,  The Bounds  of Utopia  (1980)  (examining  19th-century  utopian  communities  and
their use of law to create alternative  family  and community  forms).  American law has sometimes
recognized plural traditions in  family identity,  e.g.,  Moore v.  City of East Cleveland, 431  U.S. 494
(1977)  (plurality  opinion) (recognizing  extended family  as traditional  form deserving constitutional
protection),  and sometimes  not, e.g.,  Reynolds v. United  States,  98  U.S.  145  (1890)  (denying  free
exercise  objection  to criminal sanction against  polygamy).
105.  See  Statistical  Abstract  of the  United  States  51  (1990)  (comparing  10.1%  single  parent
households  in  1970  with 22.2%  single parent  households  in  1985):  David  Chambers, Stepparents,
Biologic Parents, and the Law's Perception of "Family" after Divorce, in  Divorce  Reform  at  the
Crossroads  102  (Steven  Sugarman  and  Henna  Hill  Kay  eds.  1990)  (examining  incidence  and
patterns  of step-families).
106.  See Minow,  'Forming  Underneath Everything that Grows.  Toward a History of  Family  Law,
1985  Wis.  L. Rev.  819.
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viduals,  and  between  those  people  and  the  larger  society  and  culture
within which they live and make meaning of their lives.  The appearance
of new  farm hands  from another country  dislodged the  pattern of rela-
tionships in the story of "The  Displaced Person"  and exposed how much
people's  identities  and  sense  of place  could  be  altered  by  relationships
with additional  people.  A  new person entering  a workplace or a family
requires others to remake their relationships to one another as well as to
the new  arrival.
These relationships  are  not  reducible  solely to  biological  connection.
Even historically,  the fact of a biological connection could be supplanted
by people's  refusal to recognize  it or to act  in accordance  with it.'° 7  In
this era of new reproductive  technologies,'0 8 high divorce and remarriage
rates, and high levels of cohabitation outside of marriage for both hetero-
sexual and homosexual  partners,"°9  a child may  have relationships  with
more than two adults  who can each  claim some kind of parental bond.
The  actual  social  and  psychological  relationship  forged  through  time,
care, and experiences  building trust better  exemplifies  what our  culture
means  by  "parent"  than  does  the  sheer biological  fact  of parenthood.
Judicial  decisions  recognizing  the  psychological  connection  between
"parent"  and child are not uncommon;  respected legal theories elaborate
the point that psychological  parenthood is more important  than biologi-
cal facts  to judicial determinations  of custody  and  visitation."'  Family
identities are contingent and mutable, not fixed.  There are multiple con-
tributions  to  family  identities,  including  biological  facts,  individual
choices  to  be  together,  community  support  or  hostility,  and  legal
recognition.
A judicial use of history to determine the kinds of family relations that
deserve  legal  protection  is  also faulty  because  it risks  privileging  some
kinds of family forms over others  without offering  a justification  of.this
practice.  The  impact  of  religious  traditions  and  other  structures  of
authority in defining approved forms of families represents one contesta-
ble contribution to family identity, not the answer to contested questions
about it.  Again, in Mukherjee's story of the wife from India who came to
the United States to study, religious and cultural forms at home provided
107.  See,  e.g.,  John  Boswell,  The  Kindness  of Strangers:  The  Abandonment  of  Children  in
Western  Europe  from  Late Antiquity  to the  Renaissance (1988).
108.  Artificial  insemination,  in  vitro  fertilization,  frozen  embryo  transfer,  and  other  devices
allow  a situation  in which  a  child  may  have  connections to  two parents  who  contributed  genetic
material,  one more who carried  the fetus through  the pregnancy,  and one or more others who take
on  the daily  tasks of parenting.
109.  See  Children  and  Families:  Key  Trends  in  the  1980's:  A  State  Report  of  the  Select
Committee on  Children,  Youth, and  Families,  100th Cong.,  2d Sess.  (December  1988).
110.  See  Joseph Goldstein, Albert  Solnit & Ann  Freud, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child
(1973).  But see  In the Matter of Alison  D.  v. Virginia M.  (N.Y. App.  Div.  1990),  appeal pending
(rejecting  claim  by lesbian co-mother  for visitation with child born through artificial  insemination of
her former lover).
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one  structure  for her  sense  of identity  while  alternative  cultural  influ-
ences in the United States offered  a different context and set of influences
on her identity.
As that story also suggests, legal recognition  is but one contribution to
family identity, and legal traditions can be in conflict with other sources.
Predictably,  then,  people  have  begun  to  assert  legal  claims  to protect
social  relationships  in addition or in  contrast to biological relationships
and  relationships  assigned  by  legal  presumptions.111  A  legal  response
that  treats  such  claims  as  irrelevant  and  undeserving  of  attention
expresses a simple act of state power to supplant identities developed and
asserted  by  people.  Of course,  the  Court  might  question  and  evaluate
whether  those relationships should be recognized and  protected, but the
refusal  even  to  discuss them  is  a  sheer imposition  of judicial  power  in
framing  the question  so it cannot be discussed.
Thus, one need not explore all the complex layers contributing to fam-
ily identities to recognize that the use conclusive presumption in Michael
H. v. Gerald D. prevents any legal inquiry into the "demonstrable  fiction
that Gerald  is Victoria's father." 1 2  Consequently, the dissenters main-
tained  that  the  use  of  a  conclusive  presumption  operated  to  deny
Michael's  chance to be heard, and thereby  violated requirements of con-
stitutional  due  process.113  Even  before  asking  whether  an  individual
claimant, such  as Michael,  should  obtain legal  recognition  for his iden-
tity  as  father  and  any  associated  rights,  such  as  the  right  to visit  the
child,"'4  the law  governs  whether the claimant  has a  right  to raise  the
question of identity and make an argument about it.  The conclusive pre-
sumption works  to avoid even that  initial stage.
Such a presumption may itself be warranted.  What seems strange and
assailable in the Supreme Court's plurality opinion in Michael  H., how-
ever,  is the refusal to even permit debate  over its warrant. 1 5  By refusing
to consider the possibility that Michael H. has a protected liberty interest
in  his relationship  to  the child,  the plurality  bypassed the  inquiry  into
justifications for  a presumption  cutting  off his  legal claims.116  Not only
11.  See, e.g.,  Smith v.  OFFER, 431  U.S.  816 (1977)  (foster families);  Lehr  v.  Robertson,  460
U.S.  248  (1983)  (biological  relationship  plus  actual  social  relationship  necessary  to obtain  legal
protection for  unwed  father).
112.  109 S.Ct.,  at 2361  (White,  J.,  dissenting).
113.  109 S.Ct.,  at 2353-2345  (Brennan,  J.,  dissenting);  Id.  at 2362  (White,  J., dissenting).
114.  This  ultimate  question  could  well  be  answered  by reference  to the  child's  best  interests
rather  than any  basis  for  the  father's claims.  See  Quilloin  v.  Walcott,  434  U.S.,  at  255;  Lehr  v.
Robertson,  463  U.S.  248  (1983).
115.  See supra, at  note  98  (discussing  infinite  regress  in  the  discussions  foreclosed  by  the
presumption).
116.  Justice  Brennan  concluded  that  the  plurality's  approach  allows  "the  State's  interest  in
terminating  the  relationship  to  play  a  role  in  defining  the  'liberty'  that  is  protected  by  the
Constitution.  According to our established framework  under the Due Process  Clause, however, we
first ask whether the person claiming  constitutional  protection has an interest that the Constitution
recognizes; if we find that she  does, we next consider the State's interest  in limiting the extent of the
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does this approach  redefine the shape of liberty interests protected by the
Court;  it  also  treats  the  very  issue  of  what  cannot  be  questioned  as
beyond debate. Especially when the potential question concerns  a matter
of  personal  identity,  this  refusal  to  entertain  questions  represents  an
extreme  exercise of power beyond  the check  of potential  challenge  and
review.
C.  Identity and Politics: The Great Kerchief Quarrel 117
Sometimes,  a question of identity  may ignite national and even  inter-
national  political  controversy.  Here,  too,  inattention  to  the  relational
qualities of identity, and to the impact of patterns of power in those rela-
tionships,  unduly  confines participants  to unacknowledged  power strug-
gles just when  perceptions  of nuance and complexity  are vital.
An  international  debate  arose  after  the  principal  of  a  junior  high
school outside of Paris  ordered three Moslem girls-two  from Morocco
and  one  from  Tunisia-to  take  off  their  "Islamic  scarves"  while  in
class. 11 '  The  event  immediately  prompted  a  legal  question:  would  the
school  expel  the  girls  from  school  if  they  failed  to  remove  their
scarves?' 19
Within  days  national  and  then  international  media  coverage  drew
attention to the incident.  Some reactions from the right-wing  in France
blamed the whole problem on the influx of North African Moslems.  But
as Diana Johnstone reported  for an  American  left-wing magazine,  "the
real quarrel was inside the left."' 20  Some charged the school with racism
and  intolerance  of  difference,  whether  by  race  or religion.  From  this
view,  failure  to accommodate  the different  practices  of students  in the
school degraded their identities.  Yet, others maintained  that the princi-
pal's action represented  a commitment to  fight racism by adhering  to a
vision  of equality  and  commonality  within the  school  system,  a  vision
accommodating  every  student,  regardless  of  her  background.  Some
responded to this claim-grounded in a vision of secular humanism-by
challenging  its alleged universality.  They argued that an imposition of a
dress code could not avoid particularity  or evade the preference  for cul-
tural  forms  that  privileged  some  people  in  the  society  over  others.  A
dress code that forbids Islamic  scarves but permits,  for example,  dresses
procedures  that will  attend  the deprivation  of that interest."  109  S.Ct.,  at 2354.  Justice  Brennan
concluded  that the plurality  "takes  both  of these steps  at once."  Id.
117.  A  fascinating  source  for  this  discussion  is  Diana  Johnstone, In  'Great Kerchief Quarrel'
French United  Against 'Anglo-Saxon Ghettos,'In These Times  10-11  (Jan. 24-30, 1990).  Also helpful
to the following discussion is Robert  Malley, Ex Une Plura: Reflections on theRise of Plural  Politics
in France  and Algeria (May  2,  1990)  (unpublished  paper).
118.  The school  is in Creil,  France;  the incident  occurred  in  October,  1989.
119.  In the United States, such a question  would also prompt a constitutional  issue: would such
expulsion  violate  constitutional  guarantees  of free  exercise  of religion  and  equal  protection  of the
laws?  In France,  the issue became  an administrative  and  political matter, not a judicial one.
120.  Johnstone, supra at note  117,  at  10.
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in the style of a popular American rock star, favors some cultural groups
over others.
1 21
Thus far, the controversy  is a familiar exchange over assimilation ver-
sus  accommodation,  a debate sometimes  described in terms of the melt-
ing  pot  versus  the  salad  bowl  theories  of  social  diversity.  Should  a
society  strive  to achieve  equality  by  drawing  all  of its members  into  a
mainstream, even if this necessitates melting or stripping away traits that
have differentiated  them from  one another?  Or should a  society try  to
create settings  that  make  room  for differences  between  people who  can
then live and work beside one another while preserving  different customs
and traits?  These questions reflect different pictures of the ideal  end and
also of the ideal  means to achieve  equality.
Yet, it is also a debate over identity.  On one side is a view that identity
is mutable;  on  the  other  is  the  view  that  it  is  eternal  and  failures  to
accommodate  different  identities  produce  discrimination  or  oppression.
One side emphasizes  individual  identity, the  other  group identities;  one
looks to individual choice, the other to group autonomy  constraining the
individual but resisting the larger society.  There is little attention,  from
either  side,  to  the  ways  that identities  are  constructed  in relationships
and the  ways  the background  relationships  of power influence  both  the
possibilities for individual choice and the significance of subgroup auton-
omy.  Attention  to these  dimensions illuminates  the complexities  of the
"6great kerchief affair."
An important pattern of relationships among subgroups within a post-
colonial power helps to situate the controversy.  Fears of ethnic and reli-
gious tension and threats to the social peace accompanied the debate and
reflected  underlying  discomfort  among  many  French  people  with  the
increasing  presence  of immigrants  from  former  French  colonies.  How
could France avoid the tense situation of constant and irremedial conflict
symbolized  by  late  20th-century  Beirut?  Perhaps  the  school  system
could  create  a  common  language  and  cultural  practice  so that  people
who  retain  sharp  cultural  differences  could  nonetheless  communicate
with one another.  This idea permeated the movement for public schools
in  the  United  States  during  the  heightened  immigration just  after  the
turn of the 20th  century.  Rather than positing  as  a goal  a melting  pot
that would dilute  distinctive  ethnic  identities,  however,  the  dream of a
common language and cultural practice could proceed from the view that
identities  are  profoundly  etched  and  durable.  Therefore,  practices
requiring  uniformity  at  school  would  neither  threaten  those  different
identities  nor demean  them,  but  would  instead  set  a  foundation  for  a
social  and  political  peace  within  which  different  communities  might
flourish.
121.  Id.  (discussing  remarks of Alain de Benoist).
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For some French observers, it would be a distinctively French solution
to  the  problem  of multi-culturalism.  Arguments  against  the  kerchiefs
thus  advance  efforts  to  affirm  and  reconstruct  a  national  identity  not
through forced  assimilation.  Defining themselves  against  other nations,
some French people specifically  sought to manage difference but also to
avoid British and American practices  which seem  to confine  ethnic and
racial  minorities  to  enclaves  with  less  status,  money,  and  access  to
resources than majority  group  members.'22  The peculiarly  French  way
harkened  back  to the  philosophes  and their  faith in reasoned  dialogue:
teachers in  the  late  20th  century  could  claim  a  philosophical  tradition
stemming from  the  18th century Enlightenment.
2 3
Nonetheless,  equally  "French"  participants  in  the  public  debate
argued for accommodation,  adaptation, and respect for differences.  Per-
haps, in light  of the  tug-of-war  for the  proper  solution,  the  Education
Minister  produced  an  indecisive  directive:  the  Minister  indicated  that
school administrators  should advise pupils not to come to school  veiled,
but not  to exclude  such students if dialogue failed to convince them and
their parents.
24
As another  aspect of debates over French identity, Johnstone  finds in
the kerchief controversy  an underlying conflict over the future of social-
ism and market capitalism  in that nation.  Barely a month after the inci-
dent at the school, a landslide vote  elected a right-wing  candidate to the
National Assembly.  That election indicated a strong association between
forces  for  capitalism  and anti-immigrant  attitudes. 125  Conflicts  within
the left  about how best to  treat immigrants  seemed to  reflect a broader
public  discomfort  about  immigrants  altogether.  Larger  struggles  for
power within France,  and across  the globe, thus provide important con-
texts for understanding the  great kerchief controversy.
The  debate  over the  kerchiefs,  indeed,  reaches beyond  a  debate over
the meaning of French identity.  Transcending and bisecting questions of
national  identity  and national  politics  are  two  linked  questions:  gender
relations  and  international  politics.  Thus,  for  some,  the  rule  against
wearing  kerchiefs  represented  an  important  stand  in  favor  of gender
equality that should transcend subgroup identity and even national iden-
tity.  Some feminists  feared that a school  practice allowing the kerchiefs
would simply strengthen the hands of fathers and brothers within funda-
mentalist  Islamic communities against emerging efforts for gender equal-
ity.  Those  efforts  for  gender  equality  within  Islamic  communities
especially  take  place  outside  of France,  in  Tunisia,  Algeria,  and  Saudi
122.  See id., at  11  ("The worst version of 'the Anglo-Saxon  model'  is,  of course,  Britain, where
immigrants  are  isolated  in  ghettos  and  surrounded  by  violent mass  racism.  the  U.S.  with  its
'underclass'  ghettos  has also become  a shining  example  of what  to avoid").
123.  Id., at  10,  11.
124.  Id.,  at  10.
125.  Id., at  11.
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Arabia.  Yet some French feminists, notably the president's wife Danielle
Mitterrand,  protested  the  risk  that  the  girls  themselves  would  be pun-
ished for wearing the kerchiefs, and punished perhaps by expulsion from
school. 126
The argument  over how best to achieve gender  equality becomes  even
more complicated in the context of international  fundamentalist  Islamic
societies.  In  some  Islamic  communities  women  have  reclaimed  the
kerchief, or the veil, because within the rules of their own cultures wear-
ing these  gender-specific  items  affords  a  certain  latitude  of action  and
freedom  from further sexism  they would otherwise encounter. 127  Specifi-
cally, in some communities,  only by wearing the requisite head-covering
can the women  move freely  in public  spaces without  facing  disapproval
or even violence.  Some Moslem women may find that wearing the cover-
ings saves them from being viewed by men as  a sexual object.1 28  In addi-
tion,  preserving  signs  of a  separate  women's  sphere  can  reinforce  the
emotional  support  and  status  within  that  sphere  that  some  Moslem
women report. 129  Moreover,  for Moslems displaced into minority status,
preserved  traditions may  actually  acquire  new and different  meanings.
Thus, even those who seek to promote gender equality may find them-
selves  divided  over strategies,  and those  divisions  may  reflect  different
degrees  of understanding  of cultural  mores  and the  capacity  of Islamic
women to fashion-within externally imposed constraints-the meanings
of their  own  identities.  Johnstone  reports  that,  according  to  a  French
sociologist  and  a  leader  of  a  French  anti-racist  youth  organization,
excluding  from school  those  girls who  are  not yet  ready  to reject  their
Islamic  traditions  "could  only strengthen  religious  fundamentalism"  in
its international  struggle  for  dominance."I
Undoubtedly,  there  are  still  further  interpretations  of  the  great
kerchief  quarrel.  Johnstone  reports  this  sobering  resolution:  the  two
Moroccan  girls returned to school without their kerchiefs because "King
Hassan II of Morocco had sent word to their fundamentalist  father that
his majesty did not appreciate  seeing his subjects draw  so much adverse
attention  abroad.  It  was  a  paradoxical  victory  for  the  authoritarian
approach,"' 3'  and a suggestion  that matters  of identity  include levels of
loyalty within patterns  of relationships  and lines of power.
This partial  denouement  also  suggests  the  contingent  nature  of iden-
tity; to be Muslim, and to be a female Muslim may call for different kinds
126.  Id., at  10.
127.  Cf. discussion supra of Meditations  on History (slave  woman  finds latitude for  movement
by  playing into  role assigned  by  white journalist).
128.  I  thank  Isabel  Marcus  for  this point.
129.  See  Elizabeth  Fernea, Guests of the Sheik (1969)  (autobiographical  account of the benefits
of seclusion for  village  Iraqi  women).
130.  Johnstone, supra note  117, at  10.
131.  Id., at  11.
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of behavior  depending  upon  the  circumstances.  In  "Defender  of the
Faith,"  a Jewish soldier expresses  his fidelity to his religious identity by
rejecting a co-religionist's request for a favor, while such a request might
have  prompted  a  different  response  under  different  circumstances.  A
devout and loyal Muslim girl may take off the kerchief as an affirmation
of loyalty to her father and King; an Islamic woman who seeks to change
the status  of Islamic  women may  wear a  veil in order to remake  tradi-
tions  from  within  or  even  in  order  to  secure  a  degree  of community
acceptance  while  pushing  for a  distinctive  identity.  That  such actions
may  take  place  within  a  country  like  France,  and  in  reaction  to  the
responses of French officials, underscores the interactive qualities of iden-
tity just as the controversy  among French citizens over the  treatment of
Islamic  students  becomes  a  fight over  the  meaning  of French  identity.
Similarly, the struggles set in motion by the arrival of the Displaced  Per-
son in Flannery O'Connor's short story embroils everyone on the farm in
conflicts over their own identities and positions.
3 2
Participants  in  the  debate  over the kerchiefs  committed errors  when
they  neglected  power  relationships,  such  as  the  great  power  of  men
within  Islamic  culture.  Some  advocate  a  school  policy  against  the
kerchiefs and others push a school policy permitting them; either opinion
mistakenly views  the  girls  as  separate  and autonomous  people,  able  to
make a choice  and bear its consequences  outside of continuing  relation-
ships with fathers and brothers.  Moreover, it is a mistake to read a girl's
appearance without the scarf as her own choice just as it is a mistake to
read  her  appearance  with  the  scarf  as  a  coerced  behavior.  In  both
instances, she is constructing  who she is in relationship  with others who
have large but not complete  degrees of control over her well-being.
Similarly,  it would be  a mistake  to read  a policy forbidding  religious
attire in the  schools  as obviously discriminatory,  as  so  many observers
were quick to assert.  Such a view betrays the assumption that the French
junior high principal had power as a member of the dominant culture to
restrict  the  exercise  of a  minority  identity.  Actually,  the junior  high
school principal  who  banned  the kerchief was  himself from  the French
Caribbean  island  of Martinique;  he wanted to restrict religious prosely-
tizing  in  a  school  in  which  immigrant  children  are  the  majority. 33
Looking at the identities of people and their mutual participation in con-
structing  one  another's  identities  complicates  matters  enormously  and
does not tell any observer what to think or what to decide  about a given
issue.  But this attention to the relationships between  people and within
networks of power can alert observers to their own  participation  in the
construction of identity, and to the political  struggles over it.
132.  See supra,  at  text accompanying  note 46.
133.  Johnstone, supra  at note  117,  at  10.
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III.  IDENTIFYING:  CHOICE AND  CONSTRAINT
Paradoxically,  underestimating individuals'  latitude for choice despite
their  assigned  identities,  and  failing  to acknowledge  the constraints  on
individuals  despite  the powers  to  choose,  are  two  central  mistakes  in
legal  assessments  of identity.  This  paradox  points  out the  interconnec-
tions between choice and constraint  as people negotiate their identities in
relation  to others and against the backdrop of social  and political  struc-
tures of power.  Thus  far, I have  explored this theme  in some  works of
fiction  and  in  some  legal  disputes.  A  related  process  of  negotiation
between choice  and constraint arises  for lawyers  who argue  cases about
identity,  and for judges who  decide them.
Contemporary  lawyers  and judges  did  not  invent  the  terms  society
uses  to  address  legal  debates  over  identity,  but  by  using  these  terms,
today's legal actors give them new  and renewed  definition.1 34  They may
experience  as  constraints  the  prevailing  legal  doctrines  and  categories
even though  they face  choices  about how to use them  and imbue them
with new  meanings.  Attention to choice and constraint in the construc-
tion and expression of identity could help lawyers and judges not only in
assessing other people's identities, but also when enacting and evaluating
their own.
By  turning  to the identities of lawyers  and judges,  I mean  to  under-
score two  points.  First,  lawyers  and judges,  no  less than other people,
negotiate their identities in the course of their work and their daily lives.
The potential conflicts between  their perceptions  of their roles and  their
own characters must be navigated.1 35  Even more particularly,  as people
with the  power to  use language  and state authority,  lawyers and judges
may  influence  the identities of others and  in so doing  shape their own
identities. 3 6  Lawyers  and judges constitute  themselves  in the course of
defining  others.
Second, the identities of lawyers  and judges must be mobilized  in per-
forming  their  roles, and  yet these  identities are no more  firm  than any
134.  Their choices and constraints differ from those encountered by someone with less power to
affect the social definitions of his or her own identity, but even such a severely oppressed  person finds
a combination  of constraint  and choice.  See,  e.g.,  Ambalavaner  Sivandan,  A Different Hunger  86
(1982)  (a Black intellectual  "finds  definition not in its own right but as the opposite of white.  Hence
in order to define  himself, he must first define the white man.  But to do so on the white man's terms
would lead him back to self-denigration.  And yet the only tools of intellection available to him are
white  tools-white  language,  white  education,  white  systems  of thought-the  very  things  that
alienate  him  from  himself.  Whatever  tools  are  native  to  him  lie  beyond  his  consciousness
somewhere,  condemned to disuse and decay  by white  centuries.  But to use white tools to uncover
the white man so that he (the black) may at last find  definition requires that the tools themselves are
altered  in  their  use.  In  the  process,  the  whole  of white  civilization  comes  into  question,  black
culture  is reassessed, and  the very  fabric of bourgeois society threatened").
135.  Cf. Betty  A.  Sichel,  Moral  Education:  Character,  Community,  and Ideals  226-245  (1988)
(exploring  potential  tension between  the  moral implications  of a  role  and  the moral  commitments
embodied  in one's character).
136.  See generally John Noonan,  Persons and Masks  of the  Law (1976).
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one else's.  The argument throughout this essay,  put in schematic  terms,
is  that debates  over  identity  can founder  on the clash  between  a  claim
that truth can  be discovered  and  a claim that only descriptions  and re-
descriptions  are  available.  The initial  claim  is  that  there  is  something
about the world that defies re-description.  The availability of a blood test
that  can  establish  a  98%  probability  that  Michael  H.  is  the  father  of
Victoria  triumphs  over  efforts  to  claim  that he  is  not  the father.  The
rejoining claim,  advanced  by  advocates  of social construction  theories,
emphasizes  the significance  of language  to human  perceptions  and  the
prevalence  of complexity  that defies the crude  simplifications embodied
in linguistic categories.  Accordingly,  redescriptions  are possible because
the human capacity to know is limited and invariably shaped through the
frail and incomplete language categories used by humans.  Reinterpreta-
tions of identity are likely because of the crude simplifications demanded
by the either/or and yes/no quality of questions  about identity: is he the
father or not, is she assimilated  or not?  Any answer to the question sup-
presses a third and often plausible alternative.137  Michael H. is one kind
of father and not another kind of father; the Mashpee residents exemplify
some  qualities  that  have  been  used  to  describe  Indian  tribes  and  not
others.  Or: the school  girl does not choose but nor is she forced to wear
the scarf:  it is part of how she knows herself in the context of her family
and culture.
As long as arguments over identity can be parried in this fashion, they
may  seem  interminable.  One alternative  is to shift from the question of
identity  to the  question  of who  decides  any  question of identity.  That
question opens still another inquiry: how does the language used for deci-
sion-making  itself constitute the  players,  their identities and  self-under-
standings  now  and  in  the  future?  In  these  successive  inquiries,  the
identities of lawyers and judges become central.  So do efforts by lawyers
and judges to  resolve tensions  between role  and character  and between
uncertainties  about  themselves  compared  with  uncertainties  about
others.  Constraint  and  choice  reappear,  but  this  time  for  those  who
argue about and  decide the  identities of others.
Robert  Cover  explores  these  themes  in his  remarkable  book, Justice
Accused.  He examines the ways that antebellum judges experienced con-
straints  on  their  decisions.  Even judges  who  opposed  slavery  felt  con-
strained  to  enforce  the  Fugitive  Slave  Law  rather  than  act upon  their
own  beliefs.' 3  Professor  Cover considers  the confluence  of conceptions
about  law, judicial  capacity,  and psychological  mind  sets that  allowed
individuals  to attribute their actions  to their roles  as judges.  His  work
argues that these judges had more room to act and more choice about the
137.  See  J.  M.  Balkin, Nested Oppositions, 99  Yale L.J.  1669,  1672-1678  (1990).
138.  Robert Cover, Justice  Accused  (1975).
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very  meaning  of their roles  than  they  let themselves  believe  or experi-
ence.  Cover's  work  illuminates  how  the judges'  efforts to  define them-
selves and to  resolve their  doubts  in terms of conceptions  of their roles
determined  people's identities as persons or as property.
A current  Supreme  Court Justice  pointed  to  Robert  Cover's Justice
Accused  in criticizing the  Court's majority  for thinking  itself unable to
respond  to  a  present-day  issue  of oppression.  A  county  social  service
agency  allowed a  child to remain  with  his father  who subjected  him to
violent  and  devastating  abuse.1 39   Justice  Blackmun  challenged  the
assumption of the Court's majority that the availability of damages here
was  a  closed  question  because  due  process  only  protects  people  from
action, not inaction, by  the state."4  Justice  Blackmun  rejected  the idea
that existing legal doctrine compelled the result  and maintained  that the
question presented  was "an  open one."14 '
Besides  agreeing  with  Justice  Blackmun's  view  of the  merits of the
case,142 1  commend his attention to the ambit of free action for the Court.
It must be attractive  to judges  to adopt concepts  of the judicial  role as
constrained  and  of legal doctrine  as compelling  the  results;  it is a  view
that  relieves  individuals  of the responsibility  for their  actions.  But this
view  submerges  the  possibilities  for  choice,  even  given  constraint.  It
treats  answers  to  controverted  questions  as  preordained  rather  than
mutable  and  chosen.  This  view  not  only helps  to justify results  about
which people can and do disagree,  it also closes  off humanly  made  deci-
sions from  public criticism  and  debate.'43  A conception  of the judicial
role  as  a  mixture  of  constraint  and  choice  would  help  remedy  this
problem.'44
Professor Jerry  Frug has  argued  that lawyers  try  to persuade  judges
and other  decision-makers  by  relying  heavily  on arguments  about who
they should  think they are: what character  do they identity with, and in
so doing, choose?'45 Similarly, Professor Joe Singer illustrates an exercise
139.  DeShaney  v. Winnebago  County  Department  of Social  Services,  57  U.S.L.W.  4218, 4224
(Feb. 21,  1989)  (Blackmun,  J. dissenting).
140.  The child's mother had alleged violations of section  1983  which allows for  damage actions
arising from  violations  of federal  law;  the argument here was that  the state's inaction deprived the
child of liberty and  therefore violated  the due process clause.
141.  Id.
142.  I  discuss them elsewhere, and side with the dissenters, in Minow,  Words and the Door to the
Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family Violence, 43  Vanderbilt  Law  Rev.  16  (1990).
143.  See also Cover,  Violence and the  Word 95  Yale L.J.  1601  (1986)  (judges are institutionally
protected from direct contact  with the violence  they  may order);  Minow  and Spelman,  Passion  for
Justice, 10 Cardozo  L. Rev.  37 (1988)  (same).
144.  See  generally  Duncan  Kennedy,  Freedom and  Constraint in  Adjudication:  A  Critical
Phenomenology, 36  J.  Legal  Educ.  518  (1986)  (exploring  mental  processes  of a judge  who  sees
opportunities  for choice  amid  constraints of convention and  the expectations  of others).
145.  Gerald Frug, Argument as Character,  40 Stan. L. Rev.  869 (1988).  See also Mary Joe Frug,
Re-Reading Contracts:  A  Feminist Analysis of a Contracts  Casebook, 34 Am. U. L. Rev.  1065  (1985)
(examining  how  readers  with  different  self-claimed  identities  would  respond  to  book  and  to
arguments  about  it).
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he uses in class that takes into account who students think they are, and
with whom  they would identify;  he  seeks to engage their sympathies.146
Singer found in his property class that his students did not identify with
workers  who lost  their jobs  when  a steel  company  decided  to  close  a
plant and then refused to sell the plant to the workers.  Singer crafted a
hypothetical  situation in which the students faced expulsion under terms
that seem  comparably  unfair and a betrayal of expectations.  Both Frug
and  Singer  imply  that an  advocate  can  make  more  or  less  persuasive
arguments  by both knowing how the listener conceives of his or her own
identity,  and by appealing  to some  versions of that identity rather than
others.  There  is  a  reciprocal  implication:  the  listener,  too,  has  some
choice  about how to identify, about what  character  to claim, and what
aspects of experience  to attend  to in listening  to an  argument.  We can
perceive on occasion gaps between people's self-understandings  and what
they  know  about  what  others  think  of  them.  We  can  see the  spaces
between  the identities people think they have and those they would like
to have. There are tensions between  identities people feel they have been
assigned and identities they would like to define for themselves.  Finding
these  spaces and gaps, working  with the tensions,  we may  persuade one
another to affirm and to resist who we are and who we are thought to be.
My  argument  calls  for just one  more  step.  How  lawyers  talk  about
identity  influences  not  only  results,  not  only  moments  of persuading
others.  How lawyers talk about identity helps to constitute the identities
of themselves  and  others.  If we talk more  explicitly  about how  we  all
negotiate  identities  and  make  choices  amid  the  constraints  of relation-
ships with others  and patterns  of power,  we  may  make  more room  for
discussion  of what  works for whom, and  why.  Perhaps  some decisions
will  come  out  differently.  More  importantly,  the  people  who  define
themselves and  define others in the process of reaching  decisions will be
in a position to take greater responsibility for their influence on the iden-
tities of others, and the identities of themselves.
146.  Joseph William  Singer, Persuasion,  87 Mich.  L.  Rev.  2442  (1989).  See  also  Gerald  Lopez,
Lay Lawyering,  32  UCLA  L. Rev.  1 (1984)  (exploring the  role of familiar stories in  persuasion).
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